Figure 1.--The United States and Germany had the greatest potential to build tanks. The Unites States despite a slow start lived up to that potential. The Germans did not and did not even come near Soviet production which despite the serious limitarions the Soviets faced. The British had a substantial capability, but decided to focus their war econmy on the air war. Source: Jonathan Parshall. This graphic may be misleading. It seems to include the large numbrr of largely ineffective light Soviet tanks built before the NAZi invsion (June 1941). lso to be considered is the higher level of Soviet tank losses.

Tank production was in part dependent on the size of a country's economy. We have sketched out the size of various national ecomomies and fluctuations during the War. The size of an economy by itself is not a perfect indicator of potential tank production. A World War II tank expert reports that there are four factors involved in tank production: 1) money (capital), 2) labor, 3) steel production, and 4) energy. [Parshall] Here the United States America had the greatest potential and Germany had the second greatest potential. The Soviets had a significantly lower potential. Britain had a substantial potential, but decided to orient its war ecomomy toward the air war. There there is no surprise that America was one of the major builders of tanks despite getting off to a slow statrt. The United States did not begin to serious gear up until after Pearl Harbor (December 1941) which was well into the War. The United States eventually produced slightly less than the Soviet Union because it curtailed production in 1944 when it became clear that the number of armored divisions originally planned would not be needed. Britain had a major economy, but focused its war production on the air war. And a good portion of Britain's armored needs were met by the United States and supplied through Lend Lease. What is starteling is how the stuningly the Soviet Union ourpeformed in tank production and how poorly the Germans performed (figure 1). This is especially stunning given the fact the Germans had a larger economy than the Soviets and nuch of the Soviet Union was occupied by the Germans. In addition, the structure of the two economies were such that the Germamns should have been able to significantly out produce the Soviets. This is because the Germans produced far more steel and has much greater energy inputs, two factors vital to tank production. To some extent tank production was due to desisions made by Hitler who though he had won the War (1939-41) and did not greatly need to expand tank production. He also had no idea what the Soviets could actually achieve. In fact the Germans had defeated enemy forces that had substantial tank forces (Britain, France, and the Soviet Union). Only with the Red Army Winter Offensive (December 1941) did it become apparent that they had mot won the War. But even with all the advantages and occupying a huge area of the Soviet Union, the Germans never came close to matching Soviet production. Much of this was due to the Whermacht military procurement process and the characteristics of German industrial management. Another major German disadvantage that has to be considered was that they were fighting a two-front war and the War in the West while nor requiring a huge manpower input, did require a massive industrial input, incliding steel and other critical materials needed for tank production. It should also be noted that the production numbers understate the German disadvanage. After Stalingrad (February 1943), the Germans were almost always on the densive and withdrawing west. This mean that a tank that broke down or receibed only minor battle danage had to be abandoned and thus lost. Factors even in the crisis and Goebbels call after Stalingrad for Total War (February 1943) that the Germans were unable or unwilling to change.

Economic Power

Wars are affected by a range if factors. The importance of these factors varied. Economics can be an impirtant factor, but not in all wars. Some wars are short, quick engagements in which economies were not important factors. Others or long, brusing tests of attrition in which economies are major factors in the outcome of the war. Short, quick wars became a German specialty. Germany began as the Margraviate of Brandenburg in northern Germany surronded by powerful neighbors (France, Sweden, Poland/Russia, and Austria. It had few resources abd only a small population. It evolved into a major European power, primarily by maintaining a small efficient army that was useful as a coalition partner. It becane Prussia which was know as army with a country rather than a country with an army. By the 20th century ot was no longer a small, poor country, but the economic powerhouse of Europe with the county's most powerful army. Germany developed a major industrial economy, but it lacked resources except for coal. And while it had the most powerful ecinomy in Europe, it did not have an overwhealming large economy. And in two worrld wars it tool on a coalition of countris with greater economic power, including Brutain, America, and Russia/Soviet Union. Germany in both wars chose to fight a two front war. In both world wars, the German began with impressive military victories, and in both instances sucumbed to the greater economic power of their adversairies. In World War I German manpower was primarily deployed on the Western Front. During World War II, this was reversed. German manpower was primarily committed on the Eastern Front. Only because of the naval and air war, German indutry had to primarily support the war in the West. This and the more efficent Soviet use of their limited industrial capacity was primarily responsible for the second disaterous failure od German arms.

Economic size

Tank production was in part dependent on the size of a country's economy. We have sketched out the size of various national ecomomies and fluctuations during the War. In ecionomic terms, America was by far the major ciountry with an economy even after years of Depression that was far and above that of any other country. The size of an economy by itself, however, is not a perfect indicator of potential tank production. There are two factirs that have to be considered on assessing secinomic power. First, economies varies. Switzerland and Denmark profuced a lot of cheese and butter. What was needed for tank production was heavy industry. Here Germany was very well suited becuse of its heavy industry component. While the size of the economy was important in assessing potential, it is important to see if a country had the right sectors that would permit tank coinstruction. Here America and Germany led. Second, was national priorities. Germany and the Soviet Union placed the highest priority on the military and building large armored forces. America pn the other hand had not interest in military spending. And in America, consumers and not the Government made the choices. Americans wanted to use their resources to build large, heavy cars using steel and copper and loaded with chromium trime. This would not change until Pearl Harbor (December 1941) after which the Government took over from the consumer. We constantly here comments that the Germans were not defeated, but were overwhealmed in the East by bast Soviet numbers and resources. This is waht the defeated German generals said again and again in their memoirs. And we see this repeated in internet postings and discussions. A good example is a comment blike this, "Ignore the US and USSR, they were both economic superpowers compared to Germany so obviously they were going to outproduce them." [Aggienation] This simply is not accurate. The Soviets had a larger population, but after Narbarossa, a sunstantial part of the population was under German control. And economically the Soviet Union was not an economic superpowe. In important areas (steel and energy) the Germans outproduced the Soviets. The Sovies did out produce the Germans. but that is not because they had much larger industrial capacity, it is because of policy decesions mafe by the Soviert and NAZIs.

Key Sectors

A World War II tank expert reports that there are four factors involved in tank production: 1) money (capital), 2) labor, 3) steel production, and 4) energy. [Parshall] There is no question who has the money (capital) to build tanks. It was the United States. While Congress approved approprtations for the Bavy and Air Force before the War, appropriariions for the Army were very limited. And thus work on tanks not to mention actual construction was very limited. When World War II broke out in Europe, the U.S. Armny had only 400 light tanks (M-2 Suarts). This did not change until the fall of France (June 1940), but it was not until Pearl Harbor (December 1941) that the United States threw virtually unlimited money into tank prodyction. The first result was the M-3 Grant/Lee a Rube Goldberg contaption, but actually arrived in North Africa to aid the British. By late 1943 the M-4 Shermans were becoming available and played an important role in the El Alameein battle (October 1942). capital was more of a problem for the other beligerants. The Soviets raised capital by virually starving their population duting the War. Amrican Lend Lease began reaching the Soviets in quanitty (1943) and supported the tank constrction effort. The Germans before rhe War supported the tank and other armament program by deficit spending. After lainching the War, it was supported by exploiting the occupied countrues. In terms of population comparable to labor force the Soviets Union and America were the leading countries. After Barbarossa, however, the Sovierts lost a sizeable part of its population and labir force. This narrowed the German labor force gap with the Soviets. The Germans relied heavily on forced labor from the occupied countries for their war economy. For tank construction, however, we believe that they mostly used skilled labor in the Reich and to a lesser extent Czrechoslovakia. This meant that unlike the other three factors, the countries, especially the Soviets and Germans were relatively comparable. It was in terns of steel that America outshown all other World War II neligerants. This was not classified information. Yes the Axis powers dismissed it as a key factor. This mean that country could outproduce America in tank or other major weapm system. It was all a matter of the priorities that the United States set. But what is also notable is how significantly Germany out produced the Soviets in steel production. This means that Germany had the potetial to significantly exceed Soviet tank production. Fiinally in terms of energy.Germany was in a relatively good position. The primary fuel used in Europe and America was coal. This was the rare natural resource that Germany had in quantity. And because unlike other industrial facilities, coal mines could not be evacuated east. Soviet production was this suvstantially reduced by Barbarossa. Like most of the other factors, Germany had the caoacity to out produce the Soviets in tanks.

Country Potentials

The United States had ab unrivaled potential to build tanks. It had the largest steel industry and virtually unlimited quatities of energy, labir, and capital. The quesriin for America was did they eant to build tanks. The American peoole wanted no part of another War and even after the German agrression in Europe, many Americans did not understand the danger, prederring to purchase shiny new cars driping with crome. American public opinion was cganging, but in the end it was the Japanese whobgot Ameriv=ca in the tank building husinnes when tey attcked Pearl Harbor (December 1941). And nuch more rapidly than either the Geramns or Japanese thought possible, actually than theAmerican military anticipated, the Arsenal of Democracy unlocked its war--making potential. Germany had the second greatest potential in part because it had acquired the substantial Czech Skoda industrial comple thanls to Chamberlain's Appeasement policies. Britain had a substamtial potential, not as large as America and Germany, but subtantial. As Britain and France were allies at the start of the War and while even their combined potential was less than Germany, they still had a very substanial potential. Britain had, however, to use a signifivant part of its steel production for naval building. It is the Soviet Union that had a rather weak potential to build tanks. The Soviets had a significantly lower potential because of more limited steel and energy (coal) production than the Germans. But the Soviets could concentrate their steel production on the war with the Germans.

NAZI occupied Europe

British leadership was staggered after the fall of France. Looking at the mapmof if Europe, it looked like Britain faced an impossible situation. And quite a few thought that they would have to make a deal. Only Churchill's inspired leadership and tgere experiebve with Hitler's deals decided the issue. But it was a close run thing as the prospscts were so dark. It could have very easily gone the other way. Here Chamberlain made the difference. No one kniw more than Chamberlain that it was useless to make a deal with Hitler, as Stalin would learn. Chamberlain threw his support behind Churchill. But aglance of the map was frigtening. Much of Europe was either controlled by the Germans or under German influence. Britain surprised Hitler by fending off the German Luftwaffe largely on its own--the Battle of Britain. . This is ot was Hitler had amticuppated. The Whermacht was built for short, sharp wars. Germany had lost World War I when the Miracle on the Marne turned theWar into an exhausting war of attrition. He had choices, he could make gear up Germany for total War and he could fully use the econoies of the occupied countries. He could have turned NAZI occupied Europe (the Grossraum) into an efficent economic unit to overwhealm Britain. He decided against both options including fully using the ecomomies of the conquered countries. Interestingly, the German used the Czech arms industry, but thy did not use substantial Belgian and French arms industry. France in particular had a subnstantial tank building capability. The Germans closed it down. They used the Renault truck plant, but did not use the tank factories. Rather than Hitler and OKW decided on another short summer campaign that would net them vast resources--everything that Germany lacked for an extended war. As increavable as it may seem today with the nenefit of hindsite, Hitler believed that he could conquer the Soviet Union in a matter of weeks--not months, but weeks. Ans so did his generals, although they would try to hide this after the War. Germany would exploit the occupied countries, bur except for Czechoslovakia did nor reopen the arms inbdusries in the occupied countries. It is nor clear why. Perhaaps they did not want arms works outside the Reich that they might lose controll over. The genral approach was to beung foreign workers, willinglu]y or unwillingly into the Reich.

Actual Production

Potential is one thing, but potential and actual produiction are two different matters. And as the War progressed the vvarious countries performed bery differently. Here we see the actual production (figure 1). Britain had a substantial potential, but decided to orient its war ecomomy toward the air war. There there is no surprise that America was one of the major builders of tanks despite getting off to a slow statrt. The United States did not begin to serious gear up until after Pearl Harbor (December 1941) which was well into the War. The United States eventually produced slightly less than the Soviet Union, but only because it curtailed production in 1944. By this time it became clear that the number of armored divisions originally planned would not be needed. Britain had a major economy, but focused its war production on the air war. And a good portion of Britain's armored needs were met by the United States and supplied through Lend Lease. What is starteling is how the stuningly the Soviet Union ourpeformed in tank production and how poorly the Germans performed (figure 1). This is especially stunning given the fact the Germans had a larger economy than the Soviets and much of the Soviet Union was occupied by the Germans. In addition, the structure of the two economies were such that the Germamns should have been able to significantly out produce the Soviets. This is because the Germans produced far more steel and has much greater energy inputs, two factors vital to tank production. To some extent tank production was due to desisions made by Hitler who though he had won the War (1939-41) and did not greatly need to expand tank production. He also had no idea what the Soviets could actually achieve. In fact the Germans had defeated enemy forces that had substantial tank forces (Britain, France, and the Soviet Union). Only with the Red Army Winter Offensive (December 1941) did it become apparent that they had mot won the War. But even with all the advantages and occupying a huge area of the Soviet Union, the Germans never came close to matching Soviet production. Much of this was due to the Whermacht military procurement process and the characteristics of German industrial management. Factors even in the crisis and Goebbels call after Stalingrad for Total War (February 1943) that the Germans were unable or unwilling to change.

War in the West

Another major German disadvantage that has to be considered was that tahanks to Hitler, they were fighting a two-front war. Hitler had always daid that this was the Kaiser's great mistakem but in tge end he cimmitted Germany to a two front War. The idea that World War II was latgely won by the Soviets on the Easterm Front has gained considerable currency. Now it is true that The Red Arny cut the heart out of the Wehrn nanct n the Rastern Frint. Some 70-80 percent of the Germam casualtis were systained on the Eastern Front. This is where the Germans deployed the bulk of their manpowe. But as even the most basic knowledge of military history reveals that manpower is only one aspect if milirary power. And the assumtion that industry simply followed manpower deployment is without any factual basis. In fact German industry provbided only limited support for the Ostheer. German Panzer divisions did require major industrial support. Byt as can be seen here, Germany industry did nir provide nearly the number of tanks sipplied by the Soviets and Allies. Most of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry divisions, relying on horses and carts. Mist of the vehicks tgey had were obrained by seizung civukian vehicks in German occupied Western Europe. German industry primarily supported the war in the West which awas conducted by the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe. Both of these services required only a fraction of the manpower of the Ostheer, but much greater industrial material support.

Anti-Tank Artillery

Thanks had played a role in World War I, but atactical doctrine was not well develooed in World War II, at least among the Western allies. Both the Soviets and Germans has a developed a modern tactival doctine. Unfirtunately for the Soviiets, Stalin mirfered or cimmited to the Gulags. most of the mot competent Red Arry commanders. Commanders whi has paryitipated in the Rapaplo Program were a priority target because that has associated with the Germans. Thus at the inset of the War, only the Germans has an advanced tactical doctrine. And as a result if the early battle, it was the Geramns who fully reeakiedvtgevimpotant of anti-tank artillery. Anf they found that the 88mm abti-aircaft gun, was perfect for the job. It would be the most effecrive anti-rank gun of the War. Many German battles in the East and North Africa ere won by luring enemy tank forces inti defenses supported by 88 batteries. You wiuld expect that the German 88s like theu tanks would bevprimarily deployed un the East. Britain began the strateic bombing campaign in erbnest ince the Avro Lancaster became available (1942). Te Germans had begun building rings of 88 batterues around their cities. When the Americans joined the campaign (1943) rhese bateries were sigbificantly expanded. In the end more than 70 percent of German 88s were deploted arund German citiesand consumed vast quany=tities of amunitiin shootig up. This sugbifucabtly affected the number of 88s and the anuniin avualkavkevto the Istheer and its fesoerate attemot to sten the Red Army advance West, spearedheaded by the cast output of Sovut tank factories.

Other Factors

It should also be noted that the production numbers understate the German disadvanage. After Stalingrad (February 1943), the Germans were almost always on the densive and withdrawing west. This mean that a tank that broke down or receieved only minor battle danage had to be abandoned and thus lost.

Sources

Aggienation. Internet post (June 18, 2017).

Parshall, Jonathan. "Tank production: A comparative study of output in Germany, the US, and the USSR," (November 23, 2013). 2013 International Conference on WWII - Kursk The Epic Armored Engagement.

Created: 9:21 AM 6/8/2020
Last updated: 9:21 AM 6/8/2020