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France by virtue of its climate and fertile soil was throughout European histor one of the most productive countries on earth. And before the Industrial Revolution this made France the richest and potentially most powerful country in Europe. Before the Industrial Revolution, France was at the center of of European affairs. The Industrial Revolution began in Britain. France and Germany lagged behind, but by the mid-19th century both countries were rapidly developing. Here Germany forged ahead of France. France was a world leader, but behind Britain, Germany and the United States. Industrial development was concentrated in northeastern France along with Belgium. A factor here was the location of coal fields. Except for the northeast, much of the rest of France remainder remained little changed, basically a country dominated by peasant agriculture. The more rapid pace of industrialization was part of the reason for Prussia/Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). The French learned one lesson in the War, don't fight the Germans without powerful industrialized allies. This was a lesson the Germans did not learn. French industry was based on textiles and some mining, but much less heavy industry than the Germans. It is not entirely clear why France industrialized at a relatively slow pace. It had significant technological capacity, more so than the United States. Napoleon I had promoted science and education. The result was competent scientists and engineers. We believe that the Catholic monarchy's persecution of the Protestant Huguenots at the end of the religious wars was a factor (18th century). The Protestants were the most entrepreneurial and mechanically talented group in France. French business as the industrial revolution progressed tended to be tightly held family firms in which traditionalism and paternalism were highly valued. France did develop a strong banking system, although the importance of the Rothschilds impeded the emergence of a stock exchange which played such an important role in the development of industry in America and Britain. Paris more like Vienna than Berlin became a world center for luxury craftsmanship. The development of large factories, major corporations, and heavy industry lagged behind the Germans. France developed an important rail system which as in other countries promoted industrialization. Unlike America and Britain and to a lesser extent Germany, the French rail system was not primarily focused on economics and thus was not as powerful a force for industrialization as in these other countries, even Belgium. Unlike Germany, the French economy was damaged by World War I. Much of the industrial northeast was occupied by the Germans and there was immense physical damage. France was kept in the War by American and British loans and the fact that unlike Germany it was largely sufficient in food production. The damage was why the French were so insistent on damages after the War. The Depression did not hit France as hard as America, Britain, and Germany, in part because it was not as heavily industrialized. It was, however, impacted, with riots (1934) and the election of Léon Blum's socialist Popular Front Government (1936). Elation with a socialist government resulted in a wave of strikes. Some 2 million workers went out in strike. The workers seized factories and stores. The strikes were not ordered by Blum, but were spontaneous and largely unorganized. The business community saw a Communist revolution coming. They met secretly with Blum and negotiated major labor law reforms known as the Matignon Accords. [Rossiter] The labor strife and economic confusion was in sharp contrast to the NAZIs in Germany who put the economy on war footing. German rearmament alarmed Blum. He began a major program to increase French arms production. France did not, however, have the same industrial capacity as Germany. The cost of rearmament forced the Popular Front to abandon its social reform programs. [Thomas] At the time the war broke out, Germany had a much larger economy than France. And for several years a much larger portion of the German economy was devoted to arms production. One estimate suggests $200 billion in comparison to Germany's $385 billion. [Harrison]
The German invasion put the French economy under German control (1940). The Vichy leader, World War I hero Marshall Pétain, believed that Germany had won the War and this adopted collaboration as the only possible policy.
Vichy moved to modernize both small business and industry. Vichy authorities created the General Committee for the Organization of Commerce (CGOC) modernize and professionalize small business. [Jones] The Vichy Government essentially seized control of all production including major industrial concern. Vichy synchronized the French economy with the NAZI war economy was part of the German Großraum. The NAZI economic model was implemented. Free trade unions were dissolved and replaced with state-controlled labor associations run without worker input. The French economy was open for massive German exploitation through adverse exchange rates and imposed reparations. France had the largest economy if all the occupied countries and proved to be a major support for the Germans throughout much of the War. Hitler's strategic vision was to finance and supply the War through conquests in the East. As those conquests did not materialize as envisioned, it was the occupied West, especially France that supported the German war effort. While France was a major support for Germany, for what ever reason, the Germans did not make extensive use of the significant French arms industry. They did use the Renault plants to produce trucks. Germany at the time was still using horses for logistical transport. French agriculture helped supply German food needs. Many French POWs also worked on German farms. Vichy had to ship large quantities of French agricultural produce to the Reich, causing serious food shortages in France. The problem for Germany was the NAZI centralized, bureaucratic control of the French economy was a dismal failure. The economy contracted with massive declines in output. And production continued to decline during the occupation. French production contracted significantly. The 1939 production of $200 billion fell to only $110 billion, approaching a 50 percent decline by 1943. And fell below 50 percent in 1944. [Harrison] This massive decline meant that there was much less for the Germans to exploit. Much of this was the direct result of NAZI policies. The heavy burdens placed on France and the resulting shortages meant that effective wages plummeted, reducing worker motivation. Labor shortages resulted from the refusal to release the POWs and forced worker conscription. The Germans did not supply needed raw materials. Passive resistance to the increasingly brutal Germans increased inefficiencies. French factories proved far less productive than German plants. [Speer] And as the War began to go against German, their demands increased which further impaired French production. The French rail system was extensively used by the Germans to ship French war booty, food and manufactured goods back to the Reich. And to ship military supplies for the occupation forces, especially important as the Germans began building the Atlantic Wall. The Allies began bombing rail yards and major factories. The French rail system was largely destroyed in the run up to D-Day. Vichy had created the first comprehensive plan for the French economy. This was not undertaken by any previous French Government. After D- Day the Provisional Government organized by Gen. DeGualle adopted the centralized Vichy plans for France's recovery effort (1944-45). The Monet Plan was to a large part based on the Vichy plans (1946). [Brinkley, p. 87.] Although the use of Vichy plans not publicized at the time, it is notable that both the Vichy an DeGualle group did not use pre-War laissez-faire principles and turned to fundamental economic changes and state economic planning. [Jones]
France by virtue of its climate France and fertile soil was throughout Euopean history one of the most productive countries on earth. And before the Industrial Revolution this made France the richest and potentially most powerful country in Europe. Before the Industrial Revolution, France was at the center of of European affairs. The Industrial Revolution began in Britain. France and Germany lagged behind, but by the mid-19th century both countries were rapidly developing. Here Germany forged ahead of France. France was a world leader, but behind Britain, Germany and the United States. Industrial development was concentrated in northeastern France along with Belgium. A factor here was the location of coal fields. Except for the northeast, much of the rest of France remainder remained little changed, basically a country dominated by peasant agriculture. The more rapid pace of industrialization was part of the reason for Prussia/Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). The French learned one lesson in the War, don't fight the Germans without powerful industrialized allies. This was a lesson the Germans did not learn. French industry was based on textiles and some mining, but much less heavy industry than the Germans. It is not entirely clear why France industrialized at a relatively slow pace. It had significant technological capacity, more so than the United States. Napoleon I had promoted science and education. The result was competent scientists and engineers. We believe that the Catholic monarchy's persecution of the Protestant Huguenots at the end of the religious wars was a factor (18th century). The Protestants were the most entrepreneurial and mechanically talented group in France. French business as the industrial revolution progressed tended to be tightly held family firms in which traditionalism and paternalism were highly valued. France did develop a strong banking system, although the importance of the Rothschilds impeded the emergence of a stock exchange which played such an important role in the development of industry in America and Britain. Paris more like Vienna than Berlin became a world center for luxury craftsmanship. The development of large factories, major corporations, and heavy industry lagged behind the Germans. France developed an important rail system which as in other countries promoted industrialization. Unlike America and Britain and to a lesser extent Germany, the French rail system was not primarily focused on economics and thus was not as powerful a force for industrialization as in these other countries, even Belgium.
France had learned its lesson in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). Never again would France attempt to fight the Germans without allies. Bismarck had effectively kept France isolated. His restrained polices changed with the accession of the belicose Wilhelm II (1883). As a resuly of Wilhelm's policies, Fance was able to sign an allince with Russia meaning that Germany would have to fight a two-front war. The French were less successful with Britain, but Wilhelm's belicose policies and decession to build a High Seas Fleet paved the way for military cooperation. The French war plan was Plan XVII. Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch personally devised the plan. It was adopted by French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre in 1913. The plan entailed an offensive to take Alsace and Lorraine, seized by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. The Germans had a opportunity to win the War in a massive strike against France. The Allies had an advantage against Germany in population and resources. But the Germans had the strongest army at the onset of the War and the Schiliffen Plan directed the bulk of that army at France. The Germans launched a massive invasion through Belgium (August 1914). The goal was to seize Paris and force the French to accept Germany terms, quickly ending the War. If the War was to be won by the Allies, it was the French Army that would have to stop the German invasion. The Russians could distract the Germans on the Eastern Front. The Belgians could slow the Germans and the British could assist on the left flank and to hold the Channel Ports, but it was the French Army that would have to stop the Germans. This occurred on the Marne--the Miracle of the Marne. (September 1914). The war then bogged down into a war of attrition and deadly trench warfare. The Germans decided to bleed the French Army by focusing their forces on Verdun--fortifications they knew the French would defend at whatever cost. Here the Germans were successful, the French Army was destroyed as an offensive military force. In the process, however, the German Army was also weakened. And the end even though successful in the East was unable to stave off an expanded British Army and a new American Army in the West. Unlike Germany, the French economy was severely damaged by World War I. Much of the industrial northeast was occupied by the Germans and there was immense physical damage. France was kept in the War by American and British loans and the fact that unlike Germany it was largely sufficient in food production. The damage was why the French were so insistent on damages after the War.
Much of France's defense spending was devoted to the Maginot Line Thus was a modern dfensive barrier in northeast France built along the German border. It was the brain child of French War Minister André Maginot (1929-31), who was France’s minister of war in 1929–31. There were military planners who wanted to invest in modern armaments, but the bulk of the Frenvh military was molded by World War I and the blood letting of 4 years of brutal trench warfare. A few modern fortresses had held out against German artillery with limited manpower. Thus the idea was to build a modern defensive line. The Maginot Line became the main barrier to another German invasion. It was an expensive, ultramodern defensive fortification. There was a historicalm precedent. France was reounded for building powerful fortifications during the reign of Louis XIV who was intennt on expanding French borders. Incredably, the Maginot Line stopped at the Belgian border. The Germans began World War I by attacking France through Belgium. They woild repeat this in World War II and just go around the Maginot Line.
The impact of the American Stock Market Cash (1929) and resulting Great Depression arrived in France later than it did in Britain, Germany, and other European countries. France remained relatively prosperous for some time, primarily because it was not as tied to the American economy as Britain and Germany and the country was self sufficent in food production. France was, however, not imune. The first obvious impact was the disappearance of American expatriats from Paris who could no longer aford to live abroad. Finally the French economy began to feel the impact of the Depression (1932). Tourism declined sharply as Americans and other foreigners could no longer aford foreign trips. And tourism was an important industry. Exports also declined. Many important French exports (perfumes, wine, chese,and food and other high-end foods) were luxury goods that Americans and oithers could no longer afford. Orders were cancelled and prices fell. The overall impact was to serious reduce French export income. Unemployment increased to 15 percent and inductrial production declined 25 percent. Elections in 1932 brought to power conservative Andr� Tardieu. He had campaigned one the threat of Communism. He formed a coalition government of conservatives and rightists. They opposed the New Deal style spending demanded by the left-wing parties for the unemployed and poor workers adversely affected by the Depression. The Tardieu Government was commotted to limit taxation, balance the budget and prevent inflation. It hoped to achieve revovery by replacing lost markets with increased trade with the country's colonies and restricting government spending. Tardieu Government wa also committed to the gold standard. His policies were in many wys similar to those of the Hoover Administration in the United States. Retaining the gold standard even after America, Britain, and Germany went off it, meant that the France was overvalued which further impaired export sales. French businessmen saw a devaluation coming. Many sent funds abroad, further impairing the economy. The French economy did not decline further after the sharp 1932 decline, but it also did not recover. The econmy stagnated for 3 years. Unemployment and industrial production in 1935 were basically the same as in 1932. [Hill, p. 37.] The left-wing parties increasingly attacked the Government and charged it with a callous social outlook. Tardieu defended his policies and warned that the left-wing parties (Communists and Socialists) would bring further economic decline, anarchy and ruin. The end result ewould be the Popular Front.
The Depression and unemployment set off riots (1934) and was a major factor in the election of Léon Blum's socialist Popular Front Government (1936). The Popular Front was the coalition of Communists, Socialists, and other left-wing political parties which developed emerged in France during the 1930s to achieve political power and social reform in France. It was also in reaction to the threat of Fascism, especially the rise of the NAZIs in Germany. The Popular Front won the elections of 1936 and Léon Blum became France's first socialist premier. The Depression was a major reason for the Popular Front's victory. Elation with a socialist government resulted in a wave of strikes. Some 2 million workers went out in strike. The workers seized factories and stores. The strikes were not ordered by Blum, but were spontaneous and largely unorganized. The business community saw a Communist revolution coming. They met secretly with Blum and negotiated major labor law reforms known as the Matignon Accords. [Rossiter] The labor strife and economic confusion was in sharp contrast to the NAZIs who had seized control of the unions and put the economy on a war footing. The Popular Front's economic policy generally failed. They achieved gains for workers such as shorter hours and summer vacations. This was not, however, accompanied by increased productivity. The impact thus was to weaken French industry and production at the same time German labor was prevented from making similar demands and German factories were producing arms and other military equipment at full capacity. aime . The strikes of 1936 affected the Government's image. The Government decided not to intervene in the Spanish Civil War, the first Fascist military exploit in Europe. The Popular Front was not just a political movement, but rather a social and cultural movement as well. The movment's goal was to break down the trditional barriers that separated the highly compartmentalised society of France in the 1930s. As such, the Popular Front was reviled by traditional and right-wing elements in French society, feeding into social divisions. The phrase, "Better Hitler than Blum" began to be heard./ Aftr the Germany victory in 1940, Blum and the Popular Front were blamed by Vichy politicians rather than the French military planners. While the Popular Front failed in many of its goals and failed to prepare France to resist the Germans , the myth of the Popular Front has achieved legendary status in modern France. [Jackson]
Hitler sent German troops into Austria to seizee the country (March 11-12, 1938). It was quickly annexed to the Reich. It was the first aggressive use of the new German military outside the Reich. The revamped German military was first on display in Spain (1936). France was shocked with the use of German force, albeit Austria was to an extent a willing victim. French politicians, invluding the Socilists who had seen war as the great danger were increasingly aware of the danger of German agression. And the
need to to modernize andexpand the French military. The Anchluss did not have a large economic impact .Austria had a small econmy, but itdid add to the German gold reserve and small increase in industrial power. Most imprtant was theimpct on czechslovakia. suddently the czechs not only faced the Germans akong the heavily fortified Sudentenland, but noe along its southern border. It was also a major stp in undrmining Britain's Appeasemnt policy.
German rearmament alarmed Blum duting the Popular Front. He attempted to expand arms production. France did not, however, have the same industrial capacity as Germany. And French unions were intent on maintaining the 40 hour week and limitations on over time. The result was that French arms priduction lgged well behonf that of German rearmanent. The cost of rearmament, however, forced the Popular Front to abandon its expandive social reform programs. [Thomas] France tried to prepare for the military challenge, but the size of the economy and the expenses for the Maginot Line meant that they could not begin to ,tch the Germans, especially with the inflexuble labor laws in place which Blum was not preopared to significantly challenge bcause of union support. Blum was replaced by Édouard Daladier (April 1938). Just before Daladier's appoitment, an arbitration award established normal hours in aircraft factories at 45 a week (April 1938). Daladier was appointed primier (April, 1988). He immediately began to address isuues in military productiomn.
Parliament passed an act authorizing the cabinet to issue decrees on overtime, at first in cases of inusual work demands (May 2). The Government attempoted to reduce the bureaucratic red tape involved in authirizing overtime. A decree
changed the 40 hour week law to a 2,000 hour a year law -- an attempe to improve flexibility in the system (May 24).
Arms priduction not only suffered from an inflexible labor system, but also from the high cost of overtime. French sources tend to focus on the high cost of overtime as the orimary reason that French defense production did not expand sigificantly. One contemprary source reports that many comapnies were working only 30 or 35 hours, suggesting that other issues were affecting production. [Lee] Daladier focused on overtime. He suggested inna speech that thevovertime rate of time and a quarter to time should be loweed to a tenth (August 22). His speech was followed by a series of measures addressing the overtime issue, extending the number of overtime hours allowed in specufic industries. Lehislative degrees followed (November 12, 1938). One of which was the establishment of a 6 day work week. While the French werec faced with union agitation. The Germns as a resulkt if the Munich Crisis seized the Czech Sudetenland and ulumteky all of Czechoslovkia did significantly expand its arms industry.
The response of French wokers even in the face of the German treat was to launch a nation-wide protest. French unioins called a General Strike (November 30, 1938). Remember that this was afterbMunich when Hitler's designs were increasingly obvious. The strike, however, collapsed very quickly. The Government had the Army take control of utilities. The Communists who were leading anti-Government agitation almost immeduately went back to work. [Philip, pp. 750–751.] Thevirders of course came from Moscow. Stalin understood the German threay better than y=the French Communists and this was before he decided to make a deal with Hitler.
German troops entered wjhat was left of Czechoslokia (March 15, 1939). Now therecwas ni longer any diubt vbout Hitler's policy of agression. Premier Daladier praised French war workers in a speech (March 29, 1939). He mentioned that they were working 48-50 hours a week. Hours in the avition industry were even higher. He then issued a decree for all defense industries. It set weekly hours in such industries 'provisionally, and insofar as is necessary, at 60'. And hours in excess of 60 could be authorized by ministerial order. He also reduced overtime pay.
With the outbreak of war (September 1939), the Government moved to apply the 60 hour week beyonf military productuion, to the civilian industry. Tagically a brief period of all-out priduction would not save France from appeasement, pacifism, and apathy--all leading to the failure to adequately prepare for war.
France ($186 billion) even after the Versailles settlement had an economy much smaller than that of Germany.
At the time the war broke out, Germany had a much larger economy than France. And for several years a much larger portion of the German economy was devoted to arms production. One estimate suggests $186 billion in comparison to Germany's $385 billion. [Harrison] Only with Britain as an ally could France hope to stand up to Germany. Even so, France had a substantial indusrtial sector (the third largest in Europe). The French economy was more diversified than the British and German economies. France had a larger agricultural sector and was not as dependent on food imports.
Social divisions in the country impaired this process. And the labor unions while anti-NAZi were at first pacifist oriented, like British unions. Gradually the NAZI existential threat began to be appreciated, the unions were, however, generally unwilling to acceopt changes in work rules to assist in the rearmament program. Workers in particulat defended the 40-hour week. The Communists, a important part of the labor movement, played a varied role. At first fierely anti-NAZI, after the NAZIs and Soviets signed an alliance to launch the War (August 1939). After that the Communists opposed defense preparations.
The Germans proceeded to conquer virtually all of Western Europe. After a few months of the "Phony War", France's turn came. The Germans struck on a wide front against the neutral Netherlands, Belgiym, and Luxemburg. The terror bombing of Rotterdam convinced the already hard-pressed Dutch Army to surrender. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) rushed north to aid the Dutch. The Germans then struck in the Belgian Ardenes which allowed them to avoid the formidable Maginot Line. The French and Belgians considered the Ardenes impassable to tanks. The Germans managed to easily penetrate the rough terraine, crossed two substantial rivers, and the XIX Panzer Corps rapidly reached the English Channel--cutting the BEF off from the French and rendering the Maginot Line uselss. The French entrenched behind the Maginot Line simply could not cope with the exposive highly mobil style of Blitzkrieg warfare. The German invasion put the French economy under German control (1940). German success is often atributed to weaponry. Actually France produced military equipment of high quality. French armor, artillery, and aircraft were competive with comparable German equipment. French military planning was, however, defensive. Huge resources were committed to building the Maginot Line rather than a large air force and armored divisions. It would be faulty tactical doctrine rather than wepons quality that led to the German victory (June 1940). The Germans essentially invented modern warfare--Blitzkrieg. These ideas were not adopted by the conservative French generals. The same was true with the Britih Army, but France did not have the Channel separating them from Germany.
The Vichy leader, World War I hero Marshall Pétain, believed that Germany had won the War and this adopted collaboration as the only possible policy. Vichy moved to modernize both small business and industry. Vichy authorities created the General Committee for the Organization of Commerce (CGOC) modernize and professionalize small business. [Jones] The Vichy Government essentially seized control of all production including major industrial concern. Vichy synchronized the French economy with the NAZI war economy was part of the German Großraum. The NAZI economic model was implemented. Free trade unions were dissolved and replaced with state-controlled labor associations run without worker input.
With the fall of France, France's substantial economic capacity was in German hands. France had a substantial agricultural sector. France would become the most important support for the German war economy of all the captive countries. And Pétain adopted a policy of collaboration, essentially attempting to buy NAZI goodwill by cooperating with the German exploitation of the French economy. While France was the most important support for the German war ecinomy, German policies prevented full use of the French economic potential. The French economy was open for massive German exploitation through adverse exchange rates and imposed reparations. Thisd mean shipment directives from the Germns tht the French were expected to comply with. France had the largest economy if all the occupied countries and proved to be a major support for the Germans throughout much of the War. Hitler's strategic vision was to finance and supply the War through conquests in the East. As those conquests did not materialize as envisioned, it was the occupied West, especially France that supported the German war effort. While France was a major support for Germany, for a variety bof reasons, the Germans did not make extensive use of the significant French industries. The Germans converted fromnce from a capitalist economy to tgo command ecinomy and tge results werw disasterous. Central to arms production is steel and French stell ptroduction fell. Anothr major sector is energy, primarily coal. This was central to the German war economy. Production plumeted. Two importnt industries were aviation and motor vehicles. These French indusrtries were some of the most advanced in Europe. The Germans tied to use them, but production fell far below pre-War levels. They did use the Renault plants to produce trucks, which attrcted the attention of the RAD and Anerican bombers. . Germany at the time was still using horses for logistical transport. French agriculture helped supply German food needs. Many French POWs also worked on German farms. Vichy had to ship large quantities of French agricultural produce to the Reich, causing serious food shortages in France. The Germns had an extensive opertion to ensure French compliance with German demands. One prominent example of what transpired was the wine industry. Wine did not have huge importance to the German War industry, but wine was something that the Germns wanted and something vital for the French life style. Wine expert Claude Terrail, owner of the Restaurant La Tour d’Argent, tells us, "To be a Frenchman means to fight for your country and its wine." Prominent NAZIs were big wine drinkers and French vintages, especially champagne was at the top of their acquisition list. Hitler not so much, but he liked the idea of draining as much wine and champagne from France as possible. He wanted to treat NAZI Party loyalists and his victorious soldiers as well as to damage the psyche of the occupied French people. To accomplish this, the NAZIs actually appointed Weinführers in various French regions. The most important was of course on the Champagne province. Here Otto Klaebisch, a French-born German, got the job. Talk about a cushy war-time job. Klaebisch set a directive of 0.4 billion bottles to be shipped to the Reich weekly, nearly impossible. Unlike the Vichy men, there was resistance--a very dangeous step to take. Count Robert-Jean de Vogüé, the head of Moët & Chandon, helped organize other Champagne makers and attempted to limit shipments. They firmed the Comité Interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne to help protect French interests. De Vogüé, who worked with the Resistance in Epernay, would be arrested by the Gestapo (November 1943). He was charged with obstructing NAZI trade demands and sentenced to death. [Kladstrups] This should be understood when assessing French colaboration. There were real risks to failure to comply. Surely accidebtlly, but surely fittingly the German High Command surrendered to the Allies in Reims, the capital of the Champagne region (May 7, 1945).
The French colonies were of dar less econoic imprtance than the Brirish colonies. Thev GDP was only about ($50 billion). After immediately recohnizing the authotity of the Vicy Government. The colonies gradually went over to the Free French. The Japanese seized Indo-China (1940-41). The Japanese seizure of southen Indo-China led to the Ameriucan Oil Enbago which in turn led to Pearl Harbor. The North African collines were liberated in Opertion Torch (November 1942)
The problem for Germany was the NAZI centralized, bureaucratic control of the French economy was a dismal failure. The economy contracted with massive declines in output. And production continued to decline during the occupation. French production contracted significantly. The 1939 production of $200 billion fell to only $110 billion, approaching a 50 percent decline by 1943. And fell below 50 percent in 1944. [Harrison] This massive decline meant that there was much less for the Germans to exploit. Much of this was the direct result of NAZI policies. The heavy burdens placed on France and the resulting shortages meant that effective wages plummeted, reducing worker motivation. Labor shortages resulted from the refusal to release the POWs and forced worker conscription. The Germans did not supply needed raw materials. Passive resistance to the increasingly brutal Germans increased inefficiencies. French factories proved far less productive than German plants. [Speer] And as the War began to go against German, their demands increased which further impaired French production.
France had important coal fields, but had lost some as a result of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) because of the German annexation of Alsace-Loraine. Still it was an important producer. The country did not, however, have any important oil fields. There was a small field in Alsace which was recovered along wih coal fields as part of the World War I victory and the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919). Unlike Britain, neither did the French colonial possessions. Most of France's oil was imported from the United States, Venezuela, and the Middle East, namely Iraq. [Beaujeu-Garnier] The Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) owned over 20 percebt of the Iraq Petroleum Company which was developed in the 1920s. CFP is the forrunner of today's oil giant Total. A pipeline conncted the oilfields around Kirkuk in northern Iraq to refineries in Haifa in British controlled Palestine and Tripoli in French controlled Lebanon. AFAIK operated the pipelines year round. There were important refineries in Balaruc and La Pallice. After the German invasion and occupation (June 1940), the british cut off oil imports to Vichy France. There was no way Vichy could replaced American oil because of the British naval blockade and American export controls. The Royal Navy also prevented Iraqi deliveries to France after the country fell to the NAZIs and Vichy began collaborating. Then after the Iraqi Revolt (April 1941), Britain invaded Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Lebanon and Syria were turned over to the Free French, meaninng that Vichy was permanently cut off. French annual oil consumtion collapsed from 8.3 million t (1938) to aa mere (estimated) 0.3 million t during the German occupation (1940-44). Little actual data exits concerning the Vichy era, but there is no doubt that virtually no oil was avilable to French civilians and industry. The CFP during the war was primarily concerned with survival and protecting its refieries and other vital interest. [Phuillier] The Germans were not about to share their limited oil supply, desperately needed by the military, with Vichy . The Germans were primarily concerned with getting as much French coal as possible. The lack of oil would be a major factor in military operations, but coal was vital for industry. The German victory in the West (1940) was an enormous success in many ways. The Germns gained the very substantil French strategic reserve of critical raw materials. But they failed to inteligently exploit even more valuable prize--the French economy. France was one of the major indutrial powers in the world with a large, modern arms industry, including aviation and motor vehicles. French production woiuld had played a major roler in arming the Americn Expeditionary Force in World War I. French indusdtrial production could have significantly added to German arms production. And unlike the Germans, the French were mastering mass production. The Germans, however, did not make much use of French industry. This failure was important and too often ignored. There were several reasons for this, including the German penchant for exploitation and brutality. Another major factor was energy shortages. Energy is needed to power industry. Oil for the most part was virtusally unavailable, but France had coal. Undrt German occupation, French coal fell precipitouly crerating coal shortages as well. No German policies could hve obtained oil for France, but coal was a different matter. There was no reason that col nproduction could not hve been mintained. The precpitous fall was all a result of German occupation policies. During the War there were importnt oil storage depots in France that were tageted by Allied bombers.
We have few details on rationing in France which was occupied by the Germans from June 1940 through August 1944. Actually the subject uis somewhat complicated as there were several different rationinf systems. The French had a rationing system in the early period of the war (September 1939-June 1940), althogh I am not sure just when it was introduced. After surendering to the Germans (June 1940), France was dived into an unoccupied (Vichy) and occupied zones. The rationig system may have varied in these two zones. Alasace Loraine were formally annexed into the Reich (June 1941). Thus they presumably came under the German rationing system rather than the occupied French system. With the Allied landings in North Africa (October 1942), the Germans occupied Vichy. I am not sure if this affected the rationing system. The Germans used the rationing system as a way to contol the local population. It made it easier to round up Jews and individuals considered hostile to the Germans. These people either had to register or go into hiding without access of their own to food. It also provided lists of people who could be drafted for war work, including work in Germany. French contributors to HBC mention how difficult to obtain clothes during the War or because their parents could not afford clothes after the War because of the war distruction and economic location. After liberation (June-August 1944), the French Priovisional Government issued a series of colorful rationing cupons. The type of product (bread, grease, cheese, sugar, ect.) was printed on the cupons. We have no specific details on clothes rationing at this time.
France at the onset of World War II had one of the finest rail systems in Europe. French railroads fully supported the defenses of the Maginot Line. The Great German Western Offensive unfolded so quickly, however, that the French rail system had little impact on the War. We do not yet have details, but we believe that under the terms of the World War II Armistice, the French rail system was placed under German control. We are not sure if this true at first in the unoccupied zone. The French rail system, ironically, was critical for the German war effort. The French rail system was extensively used by the Germans to ship French war booty, food and manufactured goods back to the Reich.War materials produced in not only France, but Portugal and Spain moved to the Reich over the French rail system. The French rail system as the rail system in other occupied countries played a key role in the NAZI Holocaust. Thousands of French Jews were deported over the French rail system.As the War turned against Germany, the French rail system was used to build up the Atlantic Wall. It was used to move troops, equipment, and supplies. It was also important in the German strategy to repel the invasion. And to ship military supplies for the occupation forces, especially important as the Germans began building the Atlantic Wall. The problem for the Wehrmacht was that there was no roof on Festug Europa. The Allies set about destroying the Luftwaffe. As a result the Luftwaffe by 1944 was no longer capable of depending German cities, let along French rail lines.
The French rail system was largely destroyed in the run up to D-Day. The French rail system after the Liberation proved important in supplying the Allied armies that penetrated the Siegfried line and drove into the Reich.
Vichy had created the first comprehensive plan for the French economy. This was not undertaken by any previous French Government. After D- Day the Provisional Government organized by Gen. DeGualle adopted the centralized Vichy plans for France's recovery effort (1944-45). The Monet Plan was to a large part based on the Vichy plans (1946). [Brinkley, p. 87.] Although the use of Vichy plans not publicized at the time, it is notable that both the Vichy an DeGualle group did not use pre-War laissez-faire principles and turned to fundamental economic changes and state economic planning. [Jones]
Beaujeu-Garnier, Jacqueline. "La France et le pétrole," L'Information Géographique Année 1952, pp. 65-71.
Brinkley, Douglas, et. al. Jean Monet: The Path to European Unity (1992).
Harrison, Mark. "The economics of World War II: An overview," in "The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers" in Mark Harrison, ed.International Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), (University of Warwick). We have used Table 1-3. The dollar figures are in 1999 dollars.
Hill, Kim Quaile. Democracies in Crisis.
Jackson, Julian. The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934-38 (Cambridge University Press: 1988), 369p.
Jones, Joseph. "Vichy France and postwar economic modernization: The case of the shopkeepers," French Historical Studies (1982) Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 541-63.
Kladstrup, Donald and Petie Kladstrup. Wine and War: The French, the Nazis and France's Greatest Treasure (Hodder & Stoughton: 2011).
Lee, K. "Hours of work in wartime," Editorial Research Reports Vol. 2 (1942).
Philip, Andre, "The shifting status of French labor," Foreign Affairs (July 1939).
Phuillier, M. "La stratégie de la Compagnie Française des Pétroles durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale : sauvegarder l'essentiel," Histoire, économie & société Année 1992, pp. 463-78.
Rossiter, Adrian, "Popular Front economic policy and the Matignon negotiations," Historical Journal Vol.30, No. 3 (1987), pp. 663-84.
Speer, Albert. Richard and Clara Winston, trans. Inside the Third Reich (Avon Books: New York, 1970), 734p.
Thomas, Martin."French economic affairs and rearmament: The first crucial months, June-September 1936, Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 27, no. 4 (1992), pp. 659-70.
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