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We note Russian authors addressing the subject of Soviet World War II diplomacy by beginning with the German Barbarossa invasion (June 1941). [Russian diplomacy ...] Actually that is only half of the story, but one many Russian authors who justifiably lionize the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) would prefer not to address. In fact Soviet diplomats were active before the invasion, both to resist German aggession and then to join in an alliance wuith Hitler and the NAZIs in order to carry out a series of aggrsssions of its own as a NAZI ally. Hitler's seizure of power shocked Stalin who had seized control of the Soviet state a few years earlier (1933). Soviet policy in Germany was to consider the socialist SDP as its primary enemy. Germany had a large Communist Party ((DKP) and the Soviets hoped they could eventially seized control. Thus they ordered the KPD to join with the NAZIs to bring down the SDP and Weimar Republic. Stalin was agast that within weeks of seizing contril, Hitker moved against the KPD, arresting its leadees and many members, many of whom would be killed in the Dachau, the first concentratiion camp. Hitler then ordered an end to the secret Rapollo military copperation. Soviet agents kept Miscow well informed on the secret NAZI remilitarization effort. The Soviets signed a mutual military assistance treaty with France (1935). As in World War I this would have meant a two-front war for Germany. The Soviets were the only country to offer significant support to the Republic during the Civil War. And as the War was waged, Communists assumed greater control over the Republic. The Munich Agreement was another shock for Stalin (September 1938). He concluded that the Allies were not going to resist Hitler and were prepared to encourage him to move against the Soviet Uniion, leaving the Red Army to fight Hitler alone. This led to the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (August 1939). Both the Allies and the NAZIs courted the Soviets after Hiter seized Czechoslovakia (March 1939). Stalin chose to join with Hitler. It is cifficult to plot Stalin's thought process with any surity. So we do not know what were the deciding factors. Buiut the Paxt essenhtially partitioned Eastern and Central Europe, offering enormous territorial gains. The other major factor was a lack of confidence in the Allies. After Munich this was not unreasonable. But Stalin seems to have gone a step further, cinvincing himself that the Allies were trying to push him into a war with the Germans that he would have to fight alone. His political calculation was just the opposite that the Non-Aggression Pact would direct Hitler west and in a war with the Allies, both would be weakened, creating enormous opportunities for the Soviet Union. The Pact was a green light for war as Hitler could not have launched the War if the Soviets had backed the Allies. Stalin's calculation disaterously backfired. The quick German vivctoty in the West came as ahock to Stalin (June 1940). Thec destruction of the French army meant that he nowfaced the Germans along a long border without aowerful ally. For months Soviet policy was to appeased the Germany. They delivered enormous quantities of critical matrials. At the same tome they moved to expand territorially as forseen in the Non-Agression pact. Soviet diplomacy was to use foreign Communist parties and front irganizatiions to oppose defense spending in the West. Soviet diplomacy changed dramatgically when the country was rocked by the German invasion (June 1941).
Lenin and the Bolsheviks were astonished that the Revolution they were all waiting for pccurred in backward, agricultural Russia and not the highly indusdtrialized states of Western Europoe, let alone the largst industril power -- the United States. This is not whst Marx had forseen. These were the countries with larrge proleterits--meaning industrial workers. Not only did the Revolution occur in backward Russia, but the proletarian revolution the Bolsheviks had expected to spread and take hold in industrial countries faild. The Communists in the West suffered staggering defeats in Germany and Hungary (1919). The Red Scare in the United States was supressed. Benito Mussolini, a former socialist, acquired power in Italy (1922). His new Fascist dictatorship while adopting sovialism (he Corporate State) became a fierce opponent of the Bolsheviks. There were more failures Germany, Estonia, and Bulgaria (1923-25). The Soviet Union with its peasant population found itself standing alone.
Lenin let loose a bombhell (November 1920). He surprised both Western govrrnmernts and even more his fellow Bolsheviks. He announced, "... we have entered a new period in which we have ... won the right to our international existence in the network of capitalist states." As a result, 1921 is seen as a major turn in Bolshebvik evolution, the beginning of creating a Soviet state policy. The Bolsheviks had won the Civil War, but Lenin realised the War Comminism was destroyiong the country's economy. He shocked the Bosheviks again by instituting the New Economic Policy. Essentially he dedcided to save Communism by restored at least a degree of market activity meaning capitalim. The NEP was primarily focused on the Peasantry which now owned most of the productive agicultural land--what they had always wanted and the Bolshviks had promised them. Lennin orgnised the new Soviet Government on traditional European ministerial lines. Policy continued to be dominated by the ideological dictates of the Bolshevik, now styled Communist Party. The Soviet Union needed to condfuct normal diplomatic and economic relations with other countries. To build the new state. Lenin needed capital, trade, and technology for reconstruction of a country devestated by World War I, Civil War, and War Communism. After speaking at a factory in Moscow, Fanya Kaplan, a member of the Social Revolutionary party shot lennin twice (1918). He was seriously wounded but survived the attack. The assassination resulted in a wave of reprisals by the Bolsheviks against the Social Revolutionaries and other political opponents, including left-wing opponents. The Chekka executed thousands as the Civil War expanded. While Kenin survided, his health was compromised. And he died a rather young age (1924), setting off a power struggle
Germany and the Soviet Union negotiated the Rapallo Treaty (1922). The last treaty signed by Germany (Imperial Germany) and the Bolsheviks was the Treaty Of Breast-Litovsk (1918), a humiliating treaty ending World War I which had detached the Ukraine. German nationalists who depised the Versailles Treaty ignored the the even harsher Breast-Litovsk Treaty Germany had imposed upon the Russians. That Armistice (1918) forced the Germans to abrogate the Breast-Litovsk Treatty. The situation was very different in 1922 when the Rapallo Treaty was signed. Both countries were defeated nations a pariahs throughout Europe, the Soviets because of Communism and the Germans because of the War. The Rapallo Treaty was a step out of diplomatic isolation for the Soviets. For the Germans it offered a possible way of pressuring the Allies. It also offered the possibility of deceloping and testing new weapons in secrercy. Even this was a advatage to the Soviets as it meant they would have access to advanced German technology. The Allied Control Commission had no way of investigating in the developing Soviet police state. Despite the benefits to the German military, German Foreign Minister Rathenau who negotiated the Treaty was assasinated by right-wing nationalists. Another less well understood impact of the Rapollo Treaty was to boost given the Soviet armaments industry by cooperating with German military and industrial experts. This also had major consequences in World War II. Junkers airplane company built an airplane factory in Russia financed by the Reichwehr. The Germans built other airplane factories near Moscow, and in Samara (Kuibyshev) and Saratow. This was in essence the foundation of the Rusdian aircraft industry. The Reichwehr built a poison gas factory. The Russians in particular had suffered from German poison gas attacks dutring Woirld War I. They had no poison gas plants and could not even equip their soldiers with gas masks. Krupp opened a plant in Russia which produced heavy artillery, especially howitzers. Two curious incidents were to result from the Rapallo Treaty cooperation. Three Russian ships docked in Stettin with about 350,000 of illegal grenades (October 1926). This came to light because the dock workers were suspicious of the Soviet ships. They insisted on seeing the contents. It was thus determined thsat they were an illegal shipment for the Reichwehr. Ironically the German Communists who were highly critical of German militarism rejected thev news reports as they involved a criticismm of the Soviet Union. The other curious development is that years later a Red Army officers involved in the Rapollo cooperation with the Germans were arrested in the Moscow purges (1936). They were accused of working with German officers. This was of course was true, but they had been ordered to do so. [Gumbel] The program was in fact emensly important in the modernization of the soviet armament industry. The resulting trials and executions cost the Red Army some of its most technically competent officers.
Lenin had established the principle of a dictatorial leadership. After suffering a series of strokes, Lenin died a fairly young man (January 21, 1924). Therev was no clear path of succession. His death unleashed a struggle fot power (January 1924). Who was going to be the next Soviet leader meaning dictator. Many believed it would be Leon Trotsky, after Lenin he was the most recognizable Boldshevik. It was Trotsky who had created tghe Red Army that woin the Civil War. He was one of the Old Bolsheviks that were close to Lenin. There was, however. fear along the other Old Bolsheviks about a Trotsky dictatorhip. Surprisingly Stalin was at the time still nit seen as amajor figure anf sucessor to Lenin. Trotsky certainly did not see him as a threat, secribing him as a 'barely perceptible shadow'. One major study of the October Revolution makes little mention of Stalin. [Reed] Trotsky eas seen as LKennin's heir apparent, but was opposed by many of the Old Bolsheviks. The leading candidates for a new leader were at first Gregori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev (both of whom would be consumed in Stalin's purges). Both men had had been with close to Lenin well befpre the Revolutionm. And they saw Trotsky's popularity and military stature a threat. All three as well as well as Lenin had made a terrible mistaker--underesdtimatin Stalin. Lenin whilr not close to Stalin who had been a minor particvipoant in ther Revolution, note his organizational abilitiers. He appointedf Stalin General Secretary of the Communist Party--at the time post not seen as a leadership role. Stalin quiockly grasped the imprtance of the position. General Secretary meant that was given authority over party membership and appointments. This was route to acquiring great poweer and influence. The people he appointed owed their careers to Stalin meaning they became Stalin loyalists. Lenin came to regret his selction, but to late. He took no action before he died. Trotsky might still have prevented Stalin's leadership, but Stalin sided with Zinoviev and Kamenev to oppose Trotsky. Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenevhis launched a press attack against Trotsky. With all of Stalin's appointes in the Party, Trotsky soon fell from Grace. Stlin had him removed from his post in the war commissariat (ministry of war). That left him without a power base (1925). Next he was expelled from the Politburo (1927). And then expelled from the Communist Party (1927). He then was firced into internal exile in Alma-Ata (1928). Finally he was expelled from the Soviet Union (1929). By this time, Stalin was in full control of the Soviet Uniom, both the state and Party. All of this behind the scecens political manuvring had significant foreign policy connotations. Trotsky was the laeding advocate for pursioing revolution which of course complicated relations with other countries. Stalin adopted the idea of revolution within one country turning the power struggle into an ideological matter.
Socialism in One Country was a theory promoted by Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Bukharin (who would also be consimed in Stalin's purges). The theory was was enuciated by Bukharin whi had been very close to both Lenin and Trotsky. Stalin supported the idea and it became part of the campaign against Trotsky. In fact the Soviet security operations were heavily invested in revolutionary operations and obtained control over most Communist Parties around the world. The theory was in opposition to Leon Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution and the communist left theory of world revolution. It was adopted by almost all foreign Comminist parties because they were controlled by Moscow. Trotsky's idea of permanent revolutiin was never totally eliminated and Triskite wriyings and parties continued to proliferate, nitably in democrativ countries. The Socialism in One Country theory contended that with the defeat of all the communist revolutions in Europe (1917–23), that the Soviet Union should build itself into a socialist powerhouse so it could better support world Communism. [Stalin] This was an early form of national siocilaism and duffered from the classical Marxism that socialism must be established globally. Trotsky and the Communist left argued for permanent revolution. Stalin and Bukharin argued that it did not violate either the idea of world revolution or world communism. It was adopted by the Soviet Union as state policy and foreign policy, at least obstensibly.
Stlain nerver intended to end revolutionary activities when he supported Socilalism in Omne Country theoiry. I became part of his effort to undermine Trotsky. But he did see to obstensily nortmalizxe relations with other countries. The Soviet Union would conduct normal inter-state rekatiions with other countries.
The Soviet Foreign Commissariat Ministry was headed by the cultured prewar nobleman Georgy Chicherin (1920-30). Sespite the ikprtance in most countriesd, he was essentilly a non-entity in the Soviet powerstructure. Chichedrin did not have direct acccess to the Politburo, and no devn a voice in the Central Committee (until 1925). Despite the inhintial low status of the Foreign Commissariat, foreign policy came to have considerable imprtance. Usually the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union were given ngreater prioritybyjan ntyhe Comitern. And the foreign Communist paries were for yhe most part notba normal political, but wahat might be called Sovit fifth columns. .
One track was the responsibility of the Communist International (Comintern) sometimes called the Third International. It was founded (1919). It ptomited world communist revolutiomn and was comtrolled by the Soviet Union. The Comintern organized seven World Congresses in Moscow (1919-35). It was led byh Grigory Zinovyev and Karl Radek and completely under Soviet control. After obtaining control of foreign Communist parties, the Soviets had a useful tool and support grroup for all kinds of useful ooeratioins such as penetraung labor unions, military forces, academia, schools, and media. ons. Communist parties in democratic countries could be used fior these operatioins as well as spreading propaganda decided on in Moscow. This did not have ti be done sureptously in most democratic countries.
Immediately after seizing power in the October Revolutioin, the Bolsheviks established a secret police force--the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka -- Всеросси́йская чрезвыча́йная коми́ссия) (December 1917). It was the first of a succession of Soviet secret-police organizations. It was soon led by Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Polish aristocrat who became a confirmed -Bolshevik. Hhundreds of Cheka committees sprung up throughout Russia at all adminisrative levbels. The purpose
was to protect the Revolution from reactionary forces, meaning 'class enemies'. Primary targets were the bourgeoisie and the clergy. It developed into an operation of repression against all political opponents of the Bolsheviks. It bwas not Stalin, but Kenin who begam mass arrests, imprisonments, torture, and executions without trial. Eventually LKenin also founded the Gulag. The Cheka operated the Gulag system and perforned a range of of security noperatiins, invcluding requisitioning food grom the peasanttry, supressing a range of rebellions and riots by workers and peasants as wellas mutinies in the Red Army. These operationsd continued, but under a range of different names: the State Political Directorate (OGPU/GPU), People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), and eventully the Committee for State Security KGB). The primary purpose was domestic security, but all of these orgamiztiond were involved in subersion and spying in other countries. Separate from these civilan intrlligence operations was Soviet military intelgence. Thus began by order of Jukums Vācietis, the first commander-in-chief of the Red Army (RKKA) and Ephraim Sklyansky, deputy to Leon Trotsky, the civilian leader of the Red Army (November 1918). It wa sfirst known as the Registration hency and then by differebt names. During the interwar period, it was called the Fourth Department, the Intelligence Service, the Razvedupr, or the RU. […] A major reorganisation occurred end Trotsky's hold on the Army (1926). The Fourth Department was placed directly under the control of the State Defense Council (GKO), the successor of the RVSR. As a result, its reports went directly to the GKO and the Politburo, actually bypassing the Red Army command. During in the caklderon of Wotld war II, it was reorganized as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) (1942). The main target was NAZI Germany, but operations were conducted in many other countries including America, Britain, France. , and Japan. ctiviies weremot limited to intelligence, but spetsnaz (special ops) commandos carrying out reconnaissance and sabotage. We have some information on Soviet intelgence operations during World War II.
Nothing better shoiws Miscow's ciomntrol over forein Communist poartie than the history of the Germa Communist Party. Soviet policy was often to see the other oarties of the left as as their primary enmy, basically they were iftn comptging for th same demographic groups and they were seen as apotntially unselling influence in donestic Soviet society. Rge Soviets ordred the Derman Communist pary (DKP) to consider the socialist SDP as its primary enemy. TeDKP was a substantial, party and the Soviets hoped they could eventially seize control. Thus they ordered the DKP to join with the NAZIs to bring down the SDP and Weimar Republic. Stalin was agast that within weeks of seizing control, Hitler moved against the DKP, arresting its leaders and many members, many of whom would be killed in the Dachau, the first concentration camp. Hitler then ordered an end to the secret Rapollo military copperation. Soviet agents kept Moscow well informed on the secret NAZI remilitarization effort. Many German Communits fled to the Soviet Union. Here they were carefully vetted by the NKVD. Many wound up in the Gulag where they perished. Those who survived World War II and would run East Germany were the most obsequious tools of Stalin and Moscow dictated policies.
Hitler and the NAZIs came to power in Germany because of Stalin's insistance that the Communist Party play a disruptive role and reject any attempt at joining the moderate political parties (1933). The rising power of NAZI Germany finally convinced Stalin that the Communuists needed to join with moderate forces to make common cause against Fascism. Thus the Soviet-controlled Comitern announced a change in policy. The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern agreed to a major change in policy (1935). The new approach was to form the Popular Front with all progressive forces. This was to be a great political coalition against Fascism. Communist parties around the world dutifully followed the Comitern (Stalin's) directives. Soviet diplomats were active before the invasion, both to resist German aggession. Hitler's seizure of power shocked Stalin who had seized control of the Soviet state a few years earlier (1933). The Soviets signed a mutual military assistance treaty with France (1935). As in World War I this would have meant a two-front war for Germany and create a powerful determt even for an increasingly well-armed NAZI Germany. Soviet foreign policy considered the Popular Front and collective security against NAZI Germany fascism to be a priority in its forerign policy. [Stone. p. 137.] The Comintern had agreed even earlierr to a similar approach (1934). [Preston, p. 136.] The Cointern of course was a Sivier-front otganaization. And the Soviet Uniin with its mutual assustbce treary with France had to bith maintsin good reklatiins wsith France and its leadershio of Communist world revolution to consider. Stalin had to noitice thst hen it came to opposing the NAZIs militrily, the Westrn Powers in the Populsar Front left the fighting tgo the Soviet Union. This was magnified ar Munich. The Soivuiet Uniin wa not an invited and one intetpreation of the Minich accord is that the Britain nd France were making a deal with Hitler and essrnytially unleashing him east on the Soviet Union. This was undiybtedlky a factor when the Bruitush anbd French webnt searchiung fir allies when Hitler essentially tirte uo the Munich Agreement and inbaded wgat was left if Czecoslovakia (March 1939). .
The Soviets were the only country to offer significant support to the Republic during the Civil War although not entirely altrusistically. France and Britain agreed to an arms emabrgo to limit the conflict. This almost guaranted a Nationalist victory when Italy and Germany rushed to aid Franco and the Nationalists. The Republican government only obtained significant material aid from the Soviet Union. They purcahed arms from the Siviet Union. The Republicans shipped their gold reserves ($0.5 billion in 1939 dollars) to the Soviet Union for safe keeping and to pay for arms deliveries. [Viñas, p. 233.] (After the War the Soviet Governent complained that Spain still owed it $50 million. The Bank of Spain at the time had the world's fourth-largest reserve of gold, presumbly an artifact of the colonial era. This smounted to some $0.75 billion. Some assets were frozen by the British and French. The Soviet supplied aircraft, artillery, tanks, trucks, armored cars, machinme guns, amd amunition. In addition to arms, the Soviets sent more than 2,000 military personnel and provided over $80 million in financial aid. The Soviet military personnel who participated in combat were mostly tank crews and pilots. About 1,000 Soviet pilots flew for the Republic. [Thomas, p. 984.] The Franco-British naval embargo allowed Germany and Italy to supply the Republic. Its only major impact was to restrict the Reoublic efforts to obtain supplies, especially Soviet aid. The Republic was dominated by left-wing paties, but as the war waged, Communists assumed greater control. This was futhrr by a NKVD unit bin Spin yhst ovrsaw the aresst and shooying of moderate elements. [Beevor pp. 246, 273.] The Civil War proved to be a proving ground for German arms and tactical doctrine. It was generally ignored by British and French military commanders. Soviet equipment has generally been deried, primarily becuse of the success of the Me-109. Left unsaid was that the Polikarpov I-16 was a highly innovative palner. While it had some technical issues, wehen they were corrected it did not do badly. Znbd ut was clearly superior to any Allied fighter at the time. We suspect that the Me-109's success was at least in part due to pilot training. Other Soviet equioment seems ti hve been on a par with German equipment. One major issue for the Republic was not the arms themselves, but obtining the needed amunmition. [Howson, p. 109.] Perhaps the most significant military developoment during the Spanish Civil War was Stalin Great Terror and resulting purges. The Soviet military losing most of its senior commandrs to Stalin's purges (1937-39). This mean that at a time when Germn commanders were perfecting their tactics, Stalin was shooting or sending most most senior Red Army commandrs tohe Gulag.
Hitler's next target after the Anchluss, was Czechoslovakia which had beeen created by the Versailles Peace Treaty. Hitler began to escalate his tirades against Czecheslovakia, claiming that the erhnic Germans in the Sudetenland were being mistreated. The NAZI rearmament program, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anchluss with Austria came as a shock to Czecheslovakia. Even more so, the lack of response from Britain and France. The Czechs who had defensive alliance with France were prepared to fight. Even with the Anchluss, many Europeans chose to see the NAZI actions as domestic German matters. This changed with Hitler's next target--Czecheslovakia. Hitler in 1938 demanded the Sudetenland in Czecheslovakia which had a minority German population. Neville Chamberlin, the British Prime Miniister mused how terrible it was that war should be threatened by a "... quarel in a far away country by people of which we know little." A prominent member of the British parliament displayed even more ignoramce when he told the press, "Why should we bother with those gypsies in the Balkans?", meaning the Czechs who were of course not located in the Balkans. In the end, The British and French gave in at talks held in Munich. Chamberlain flew back to London and stepping off the plane waved the agreement signed ny Herr Hitler which he assured the waiting repoters guaranteed "Peace in our time." Churchill was apauled. Most British anf French people were releaved. One question often not asked by journalists at the time was where was Stalin? Btritain and Franbce survuved Woirkd S I inly beczuse of Stalin and trhe Eastern Front. Yet neithr Britin or Francec wanted Mrshall Stalin at the table in Munich. As a result, Stalin, who was not at the conference drew the conclusion that the British and French could not be trusted as potential allies against Hitler. Less well recognized is the impact on the United States. There are many unanswered questions about Munich. Some maintain that if the Allies had honored their treaty obligations that the Wehrmacht would have arrested Hitler rather than gone to war. Others argue that if Hitler had gone to war in 1938, he wluld have not only overrun France, but the Luftwaffe would have defeated the RAF. The Munich Agreement was another shock for Stalin (September 1938). The Sovuet Unioin had not been invited. He concluded that the Allies were not going to resist Hitler and were prepared to encourage him to move east against the Soviet Uniion, leaving the Red Army to fight Hitler alone.
Shortly bedore the outbreak of World War II Stalin sensing that the Allies were trying to firect Hitler east, chose Vyacheslav Molotov as the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs to relace Maksim Litvinov (May 1939). Litvinov (1876-1951) was a Russian revolutionary and prominent Bolshevik with connctions to Lenin. He was born into a wealthy, Yiddish-speaking Lithuanian Jewish banking family. He advocated the negotition of diplomatic agreements leading towards disarmament. Litvinov hlped make the Soviet Union a party to the Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928). He sponsored wht might be called the Litvinov Protocol, a multilateral agreement using the the Kellogg-Briand Pact to help mregularize relationsd with neighboring states. Stalin appointed him People's Commissar (Minister) of Foreign Affairs (1930). After Hitler rise to power, Litvinov emerged as the major spokesmn fgor Soviet policy of collective security and the Popular Front. He woirked with the Western powers to oppose NAZI expzansion. azi Germany. His leadership of internatiinal resistance to NAZI Germany caught the ire of Hitler. Stalin as his mind began to shift from confrointing Hitler to a mire accompdating stance, diismissed Litvinov anreolaced him with Vyacheslav Molotov, astaunch Stalinist. Molotov proceeded to purge the Commissariat whivh he claimed was filled with Jews. The change was noted in Berlin which HHitler saw as a signal that the Soviets were prepared to deal. The result was the NAZI-Soviet Pact 3 months later. Molotov later commented that it was mere chance that Litvinov with all his Western contacts had escaped the purges.
This led to the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (August 1939). Both the Allies and the NAZIs courted the Soviets after Hiter seized Czechoslovakia (March 1939). Stalin chose to join with Hitler. It is cifficult to plot Stalin's thought process with any surity. So we do not know what were the deciding factors. Buiut the Paxt essenhtially partitioned Eastern and Central Europe, offering enormous territorial gains. The other major factor was a lack of confidence in the Allies. After Munich this was not unreasonable. But Stalin seems to have gone a step further, convincing himself that the Allies were trying to push him into a war with the Germans that he would have to fight alone. His political calculation was just the opposite that the Non-Aggression Pact would direct Hitler west and in a war with the Allies, both would be weakened, creating enormous opportunities for the Soviet Union. The Pact was a green light for war as Hitler could not have launched the War if the Soviets had backed the Allies.
We note Russian authors addressing the subject of Soviet World War II diplomacy by beginning with the German Barbarossa invasion (June 1941). [Russian diplomacy ...] Actually that is only half of the story, but one many Russian authors who justifiably lionize the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) would prefer not to address. In fact Soviet diplomats were active before the invasion, first to resist German aggession and then to join in an alliance with Hitler and the NAZIs in order to carry out a series of aggrsssions of its own as a NAZI ally. NAZI-Soviet cooperation was deep and extensive. The Russians toiday do not like to admit it, but the histiorical record is very clear and vcan nit bevdenined except in countrues like Russia where the Government writes the history books and stamps out groups like Memorial that try to write real history.
Stalin's calculation seem to have disaterously backfired. The quick German victory in he est, in part made possible by deliveries of Soviet raw material, ame as a shock to Stalin (June 1940). He had expected a long-drawn Workld War I type debilitating struggle. The destruction of the French Army meant that the Soviet Union nowfaced the even more powrful Germans along a long border without a powerful continental ally in the West. For months Soviet policy was to appeased the Germans. They delivered enormous quantities of critical matrials. Stlain's policy seems to havebeen to buy time. He ought to stave off an invasiio by making the Soviet Union so useful to Hityler ghat he would not attack. i
In addition to appasing Hitler by deliveries of raw material, Stalin to strengthen his western border by seizing stratgic points and puhing the border west. Much of Poland was acquited (Sepoember 1939). Additional agreessions tergetted Finland, Estibia, Latvia, Lithuania, Nabd Romania--virtually the Soviet entire western border. Although it is the NAZI aggressions that are most commonly addressed in World War II histories, the Soviet Union compiled nearly as long a list of aggressions as the NAZIs. The Soviet Union also invaded Poland, only two weeks later. Operating within secret protocols to the NZI-Soviet Pact, Hitler and Stalin were in fact close partners in the waging of aggressive war. The Great Patriotic War/Ostkrtieg fought against the NAZIs after the 1941 German invasion came to be an icon in Soviet history. Left unsaid was the fact that Hitler and Stalin were partners in the virtul partition of Europe. And the mnassive Red Army gave Stalin the capability of enforcing his will on the small, poorly armed comtries of Easter Europe. The first target was Poland which both NAZI Germany and the Soviet Union invaded launching World War II (September 1939). After Poland, the first target was Finland, but Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania were also targets. The Soviet invasion of Finland had significant repercussions. The Allies for a time considered actively aidinging Finland, but the Germans offensives in the West soon made that impossible. The poor performance of the Red Army in Finland was a factor in Hitler's decission to attack the Soviet Union before Britain had been defeated.
Stalin was not only satisfied with the alliance wityh NAZI germany, he wanted to become a full member of the Axis, expanding it to four major mermbers. [Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze, p. 201.] Such a pact in 1940 with America still largely unarmed, France defeated, and Britain battered and driven off the European Continent would have been by far the dominant world military power. This was the situation when Molotov traveled for the Berlin talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop (November 1940). The somewhat testy talks were followed by each country putting forward written proposals followng up on the oral exchanges. The German document reinterated Hitler's desire for the Soviet's to look south toward British India. Hitler was very good at giving away other country's trritory. A major focus of German policy was addressing the country's limited access to resources. The German's anted to secure access to Finland's rsources and to its major oil resource--Romania. The Sovietrs were pressing in both areas and two weeksd after the tlks invade Finland (November 30). They had already annexed large areas on northeastern Romania. Molotov following Stalin's orders was the first foreign leader to stand firm against German demands and Hitler, at the peak of hisd power duid not like it. His major demands were to establish Fuinland as a German client state and gain a warm water port in the Baltic. The Soviets calculation at this stage after it was becoming clear that Gerrmany could noit cross the Channel and America was beginnin to rearm, albeit sloweky, that the War was far from over and was shaping up mto be an extended struggle with Gerrmany blockaded and lacking many vital resources, especially arms. Molotiv dismissed German claims that Britain weas in its last legs. The fact the participants had to retire to a bonb sheltr during a British irvraid did not help the German contntions. The Soviets were intent to remain influential in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Soviet written proposal was personally drafted by Stalin expressing a desire to concert the Tri-Partate Axis Pact binto a Four Power Pact (November 25). It included not only Soviet rights to Bulgaria, but a world sphere of influence, to be centred on the area around Iraq and Iran. [Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze, p. 201.] This notably was an area of oil production, tyhe one resource that Hitler coveted most and that Germany's limited supples were being augmented by Soviet deliveries as part of their alliance. Germany delayed responding as Hitler made the ateful decision to invade the Soviert Union. He was already laready invlined to prepare an invasion and had ordered preliminary planning. But the Berlin talks with Molotoiv seemed to have made up his mind. In fact, Germany never respoonded to the Soviet proposal and used delaying tactics as Barbarossa was being prepared. [Roberts, p. 57.] We know a great deal about Hitler's thinking at the time. Hitler told to his top military commanders that Stalin '... "demands more and more", 'he's a cold-blooded blackmailer,' and "a German victory has become unbearable for Russia.' And pointedly that 'she must be brought to her knees as soon as possible'. [Shirer, p. 668]
At the same time they moved to expand territorially as forseen in the Non-Agression pact. Soviet diplomacy was to use foreign Communist parties and front organizations to oppose defense spending in the West. Britaion wa at wr, they could not impede defense spending there, buty they could in America where powerrful groups like the Isolationists were opposing defense spending and aid to Btitain. The NAZUs were ciovertly aiding the Isolationists. Communist and Communist front organizations had a loud voice in the media and to adegree affected liberal thinking. It i fascinating that with the NAZis controlling most of Europe and moving forces east that Stalin still saw his major threat was the capitalist democratic West. Stalin was not an idiot, but he was a man whiose thinking, like that of Hitler, was very influenced by an ideological prism.
Soviet diplomacy changed dramatgically when the country was rocked by the German invasion (June 1941). The Battle of Britain in many ways changed the course of the War. An invasion of Britain was impossible without air superiority. Hitler, fearing a cross-Channel invasion, decided that the only way to force the British to seek terms was to destroy the Soviet Union. He began shifting the Wehrmacht eastward to face the enemy that he had longed to fight from the onset--Soviet Russia. The nature of the War changed decisevely in the second half of 1941. The Germans invaded Russia in June 1941, launching the most collosal military campaign in all of history. It is estimated that on the eve of battle, 6.25 million men faced each other in the East. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. Stalin ignored warnings from the British who as a result of Ultra had details on the German preparations. Stalin was convinced that they were trying to draw him into the War and until the actual attack could not believe that Hitler would attack him. The German attack was an enormous tactical success. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. The Soviet Air Force was destoyed, largely on the ground in the irst week. The Germans captured 3.8 million Soviet soldiers in the first few months of the campaign. No not knowing the true size of the Red Army, they thought they had essentally won the War. German columns seized the major cities of western Russia and drove toward Leningrad and Moscow. But there the Soviets held. The Japanese decission to strike America, allowed the Sovierts to shift Siberian reserves and in December 1941 launch a winter offensive stopping the Whermacht at the gates of Moscow--inflicting irreplaceable losses. The army that invaded the Soviet Union had by January 1942 lost a quarter of its strength. Hitler on December 11 declared war on America--the only country he ever formally declared war on. In an impassioned speech, he complained of a long list of violations of neutality and actual acts of war. [Domarus, pp. 1804-08.] The list was actually fairly accurate. His conclusion, however, that actual American entry into the War would make little difference proved to a diasterous miscalculation. The Germans who months before had faced only a battered, but unbowed Britain now was locked into mortal combat with the two most powerful nations of the world. The British now had the allies that made a German and Japanese victory virtually impossible. After the Russian offensive of December 1941 and apauling German losses--skeptics began to appear and were give the derisory term " Gröfaz ".
World War II historians tend to give great attention to Hitler in the run up to World War II and virtually ignored Stalin , concludung that he was sucessfully duoed by Hitler leading to the dusaterius Barbarissa invasion. Well it is true that Hitler did fool Stalin and tghat Barbariss potivided Hiutkler pklaying a weak habd an oppoortunity to destroy the Red Aemy and poossiblt actually win Workd War II. Yet this was only because the French ASrmy largely collapsed after only two weeks of combat. This is an outcome that could not have been preducted looking at the balance of forces in place in 1940. Of course the crituically needed oil and other resources porovide Hitler with the supplies he needed for victory in the West. But Stalin's calculations that the Allies and Germans would fight a long debilitating war in the West and the Siviet Union could pick up the shatered pieces was mor precient that largely understood. [McMeekin]. Almost unsaid is wgat Sralin's policies actually accomplished. Stalin achieved making Germany the focus of the SAllied war effort, locking Hitler into a war in the West whivh as not what he wanted, escecially a war with Britain and eventiually America. At the same time Stalin invaded Poland and seized vast territory in Eastern Eurooe and remained at peace weith the West. Now many authors dismiss the War in the West as marginal. And it is true that the great bulk of German manpoweer was committed to the Ostkrieg, but often not understood is the graet bulk of Germam indudtry had to be committed to the War in the West. This mean tght the Ostheer fought the most decisive battle of the War without the supplies and support it needed. Despite Goebbels propaganda movies of modern rmy spearheaded by massive tanks, the German soldier moved east largely on foot with horse drawn carts, not unlike Napaoneon's Grande Armée (1812). In the end, Stalin's, not Hitler's calculatuon proved correct, albeit at great cost to the Soviet people.
Beevor, Antony. The Battle for Spain (Penguin Books: 2006).
Domarus, Max. Hitler Reden und Proklamationen 1932-45 Vol. 1-2 (Neustadt a.d. Aisch: Velagsdruckerei Schmidt, 1962-63).
Howson, Gerald. Arms for Spain, The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (1998).
McMeekin, Sean. Stalin's War: A new History of World War II (2021). Mc Meekin's book proivides a rarely esplsined insiught into WEorld War II. He moves the picdenter of the War East wityhout dismissing the vital role of the War in the West. Hitler’s genocidal gials unleash Armageddon, but the War as it develioped was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. And in Asia, the Americns accomplished an important Soviet goal defeated the Japanese at substantil cost. Through it all, from the begimnning, it was the Anglo-Saxon capitalist powers that as his ultimate threat. And thry helped him build the Sobit Union into a super power.
Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich, Adam Bruno Ulam, and Gregory L. Freeze. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German–Soviet Relations, 1922–1941 (Columbia University Press: 1997).
Preston, Paul. A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War (London, 1986).
Reed, John. Ten Days That Shook the World.
Roberts, Geoffrey. (2002), Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany, and the Origins of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Historiography (2001).
Shirer, William L. Stalin, Josif. "Socialism in one country versus permanent evolution" October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists (December 17, 1925).
Stone, Glyn. "Britain, Non-Intervention and the Spanish Civil War," Europeam History Quarterly Vol. 9, Issue 1 (Janusary 1979), pp. 129-49.
Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War (1986).
Viñas, Angel. "The Gold, the Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War," European History Qurterly Vol. 9, Issue 1 (January 1979), pp. 105-28..
"Russian diplomacy during WWII, " The Voice of Russia (May 6, 2010).
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Last updated: 5:29 PM 11/26/2021
