*** war and social upheaval: World War II -- logistics and transport rtoad transport








World War II Logistics and Transport: Land Continental--Road Transport

American World War II maintenence and repair operations
Figure 1.-- Here we see American soldiers in France (about August 1945). These are the men that kept American trucks and tanks rolling to liberate Frabce abnd smash the NAZI Reich. They are posed with their Dodge wrecker truck 'Martiene' and two little French friends apparently impressed with their work. The Allies not only produced far more tanbks than the Germans, but becuse of superior maintenance and repair opertions kept many more of the tanks they had in opertion. Te varying maintennce and repair functions effectively increased the number of tanks and vehicles of the American units and reduced the strength of the German units.

The Germans built the first modern highway system--the Autobahn. They did not play major role in the War, princpally because the Germans had so few cars and trucks. Images of theAutobahn rarely show maby vehicles on them. The greatest miitary usewas made by the Americans when they entered the Reich in the final months of the War. It was the Reichbahn that dominted military tanspoprt. While rail was the most efficient land transport, rails had a significant limitation. First, the rails did not extend everywhere. This was especially the case in the highly mobile World War II battlefields. Thus you needed to get men and material from railheads to the front. Second, unlike World War I, rails in World War II could be interdicted. (The same was true of trucks, but not easily because rail lines were were not as spread out as roads and had vulnerablev hubs. In the East this meant partisan action. In the West it meant Allied air power. As a result, while rail transport was the most important mode of transport in the European campaign, road transport meaning trucks played a key role in the War. American Lend lease trucks played a huge role in Soviet successes like Bagration. And with the distruction of the French rail system by Allied air power (1944), trucks payed a critical role in the Western campaign after D-Day. With trucks the llies haf a huge advantage. First, Allied productioin far exceeded Axis profuction. This is one reason the Germans used so many horses in the War. The American Arsenal of of Democracy gave the Allies, especially the automobile industry, gave the Allies a huge advantage. Second, trucks ran on gasoline or diesel and oil was the German Achilles' heel. The Germans could not have used many more trucks, even if they had been ble to build them because they did not have the oil. Third, the Germans had maintenance ptoblems. They seized vehicles from all over occupied Europe. Thus they rarely had spare parts for even minor repairs. This might have been possible for centalized minenamnce facilities in the Reich. It was impossible for motorpools througout NAZI-occupied Europe to stock all the needed spare parts. Fourth, few Germans had mechannical skills. Car ownershio in Germany was low even by Europeamn stabdards. Unlike America German motor pools did not not have a reservoir of talent to drawn on to maintain motor vehicles. There were plenty of farm boys who knew how to care for horses, but very few that knew how to operate and maintain motor vehicles. Knowledge of maintaining motor vehicles was something that was was widespread among young Americans Who were not only able to afford autmobiles, but loved working on the. There were even shop classes in high schools, something that did not exist in Germany. This all had significant impacts on transport trucks, but these pronlems became even more serious for tanks--a major pat of the German military success. And tanksd were even nmore of problem. it became even more important for tanks. Tanks were much more complicated than trucks--especially German tnks which haveb described as 'over enginnered'. Unlike Ameican and Soviet tanks, Germnan engineers made no effort to simplify designs or to make the tanks easy work on or maintain. And as the war progressed, the Germans came out with mote new tanks, each one in more and more complicated. The Germans haf sight major designs each made in a range of variants. A major problem was the shortage of spare parts. This all created a nightmare for German field motorpools. There was no way field motorpools could stock the spare parts needed or work efficently on the various tanks, trucks, and other vehicles with the available staff. The Germans did not have the same capacity to repair vehicles at the front. The initial plan was to send them back to the Reich for even minor repors. With Barbarossa, the Germans were forced to increase maintenance capability at the front, but were never able to meet the demand. [Mueller-Hillebrand] (With the Luftwaffe the ituation was even worse.) Not only did this stress the overstreahed Reichbabn, but as the sitution changed in the East, a retreating Ostheer lost increasing anount of armor. In the West, wihout contol of the air, damaged vehicles were unlikely to make it back to the Reich. he Americans in contrast made the repairs near the front and and the vehicles quickly serviced. Another imprtant factor was that American tanks and trucks were designd for ease of manufacture and maintnance. The Germans abticipated maintance and reoair work was to be conducted in centralized facilities in the Reich. This worked resonably well until the Germabs invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). It was also a pserious problem in North Africa. Not only did the Germans produce only a fraction of the vehicles produced by the Allies, but they had trouble keepin the vehicles they running, not only finmding the needed fuel as well as maintaing and repoairing them.

Sources

Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhart H. "German tank maintenance in World War II," German Report Series Pamphlete No. 20-202 (U.S. Army: June 1954). While published by the U.S. Army Historical Division (EUCOM) by a. group of former German generals, general sta1f officers, and tank maintenance specialists. The principal author was General Burkhart H. Mueller-Hillebrand who served as aide to the Chief of the Army General Staff before assuming command of an armored regiment on the Russian front and then progressively higher commands.







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Created: 12:04 AM 5/21/2022
Last updated: 12:04 AM 5/21/2022