Figure 1.-- Here we see American soldiers in France (about August 1945). These are the men that kept American trucks and tanks rolling to liberate Frabce abnd smash the NAZI Reich. They are posed with their Dodge wrecker truck 'Martiene' and two little French friends apparently impressed with their work. The Allies not only produced far more tanbks than the Germans, but becuse of superior maintenance and repair opertions kept many more of the tanks they had in opertion. Te varying maintennce and repair functions effectively increased the number of tanks and vehicles of the American units and reduced the strength of the German units.

The Germans built the first modern highway system--the Autobahn. They did not play major role in the War, principally because the Germans had so few cars and trucks. Images of the Autobahn rarely show many vehicles on them. The greatest military use was made by the Americans when they entered the Reich in the final months of the War. It was the Reichbahn that dominated German military transport. While rail was the most efficient land transport, rails had a significant limitation. First, the rails did not extend everywhere. This was especially the case in the highly mobile World War II battlefields. Thus you needed to get men and material from trailheads to the front. Second, unlike World War I, rails in World War II could be interdicted. (The same was true of trucks, but not easily because rail lines were were not as spread out as roads and had vulnerable hubs. In the East this meant partisan action. In the West it meant Allied air power. As a result, while rail transport was the most important mode of transport in the European campaign, road transport meaning trucks played a key role in the War. American Lend lease trucks played a huge role in Soviet successes like Bagration. And with the destruction of the French rail system by Allied air power (1944), trucks payed a critical role in the Western campaign after D-Day. With trucks the Allies had a huge advantage. First, Allied production far exceeded Axis production. This is one reason the Germans used so many horses in the War. The American Arsenal of of Democracy gave the Allies, especially the automobile industry, gave the Allies a huge advantage. Second, trucks ran on gasoline or diesel and oil was the German Achilles' heel. The Germans could not have used many more trucks, even if they had been ble to build them because they did not have the oil. Third, the Germans had maintenance problems. They seized vehicles from all over occupied Europe. Thus they rarely had spare parts for even minor repairs. This might have been possible for centralized maintenance facilities in the Reich. It was impossible for motor pools throughout NAZI-occupied Europe to stock all the needed spare parts. Fourth, few Germans had mechanical skills. Car ownership in Germany was low even by European standards. Unlike America German motor pools did not not have a reservoir of talent to drawn on to maintain motor vehicles. There were plenty of farm boys who knew how to care for horses, but very few that knew how to operate and maintain motor vehicles. Knowledge of maintaining motor vehicles was something that was was widespread among young Americans Who were not only able to afford automobiles, but loved working on the. There were even shop classes in high schools, something that did not exist in Germany. This all had significant impacts on transport trucks, but these problems became even more serious for tanks--a major pat of the German military success. And tanks were even more of a problem. it became even more important for tanks. Tanks were much more complicated than trucks--especially German tanks which have been described as 'over engineered'. Unlike American and Soviet tanks, German engineers made no effort to simplify designs or to make the tanks easy work on or maintain. And as the war progressed, the Germans came out with mote new tanks, each one in more and more complicated. The Germans had several major designs each made in a range of variants. But thy also used many foreign tucks A major problem was the shortage of spare parts. This was a problem for German truck. Getting spare pats for the many different foreign tucks was next to impossible. This all created a nightmare for German field motor pools. There was no way field motor pools could stock the spare parts needed or work efficiently on the various tanks, trucks, and other vehicles with the available staff. The Germans did not have the same capacity to repair vehicles at the front. The initial plan was to send them back to the Reich for even minor repairs. With Barbarossa, the Germans were forced to increase maintenance capability at the front, but were never able to meet the demand. [Mueller-Hillebrand] (With the Luftwaffe the situation was even worse.) Not only did this stress the overstretched Reichsbahn, but as the situation changed in the East, a retreating Ostheer lost increasing amount of armor. In the West, without control of the air, damaged vehicles were unlikely to make it back to the Reich. he Americans in contrast made the repairs near the front and and the vehicles quickly serviced. Another important factor was that American tanks and trucks were designed for ease of manufacture and maintenance. The Germans planned for maintenance and repair work to be conducted in centralized facilities in the Reich. This worked reasonably well when campaigns were fought in neighboring countries close to he Reich. Then the Germans invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). It was also a serious problem in North Africa. Not only did the Germans produce only a fraction of the vehicles manufactured by the Allies, but they had trouble keeping the vehicles they had running -- not only finding the needed fuel as well as maintaining and repairing them.

Rail Eficeny and Limitaions

The most effien way of moving people and goods goods is by water. this includies maritime oceanroutes and roveinecanal routes. Thisgetsdown to basic physic. There is less friction and this hus more fuelis needed to ovrcome friction when mocng goods by land. Tailsovercame iverine./canal routesncause rivers did not go every where. An eail links were chraper to build than vanals. nd trains movd faster than canal barges. Motor vhicles were far less efficienten than rail, bu eded to cmlete the mvement of people and goods from h ail head or station to tefactory or consumer. Really large factories might haverail service, but most did not. While rail was the most efficient land transport, rails had significant limitations. First , the rails did not extend everywhere. This was especially the case in the highly mobile World War II battlefields. Thus you needed to get men and material from trailheads to the front. Second, unlike World War I, rails in World War II could be interdicted. (The same was true of trucks, but not easily because rail lines were were not as spread out as roads and had vulnerable hubs. In the East this meant partisan action. In the West it meant Allied air power. As a result, while rail transport was the most important mode of transport in the European campaign, road transport meaning trucks played a key role in the War.

Fuel

The 19th century was the century of coal. Coal powered an riverboats and train engins. Oil was, however, the fuel of thefuture. Automobile and truck as well as militay vehicles like tanks, notto mention planes and naval ships, however, needed liquiuid oil-based propllens like gasolline and diesel. This changed the dynamics of modern warefare. Many countries had coal, only a few countries had oil. Much of the world's petroleum producion was based in or contolled by American companies. British companies were also imprtant, but none of their major production wa actually in Britain. France also hadvirtually no oil. Neiher id Germany. They were bulding a sythethic fuel system, bt it was vert dxensveand aonly supplied a fraction ofthe vcountry's needs. The Dutch aslohad no oil, but had found oil in the Dutch Easts Indies. he Sviets had profuciv oilfirl in he Caspan basin. They were small b wld standad, but mre than suplied Sviet and Red Army needs. Japan also had no oil, either on the Home Islands or expanding Empire (manchria. Korea, aian, and China.) Worst still, Japan's major supplier of oil was the United States.

Automotive Industries

Just as the United State dominated the production and refning of il, Ameriacn companies fominated the produvtion of motot vehicles, both cars and trucks. Thanks to Hnryy Ford, the United States had astered the assembly line and mass proidyction. Britain andfae werein second place and third olace, but far below Ameican produvtion levels. Germany was an also run in automobile profuction. They produced some beautifully engineered automobiles, but actual prodyction numbers were were very limited. The German industrial mind-set was on quality and craftsmanship -- not mass prodyction. Japan manufactyred almost no motor vehicles. The Soviets poduced almost no ars, but thanks to American joint ventures, did produce trucks and tractors. American Lend lease trucks played a huge role in Soviet successes like Bagration. And with the destruction of the French rail system by Allied air power (1944), trucks payed a critical role in the Western campaign after D-Day. With trucks the Allies had a huge advantage. First, Allied production far exceeded Axis production. This is one reason the Germans used so many horses in the War. The American Arsenal of of Democracy gave the Allies, especially the automobile industry, gave the Allies a huge advantage. Second, trucks ran on gasoline or diesel and oil was the German Achilles' heel. The Germans could not have used many more trucks, even if they had been ble to build them because they did not have the oil.

Mainteance and Repair

Third, the Germans had maintenance problems. They seized vehicles from all over occupied Europe. Thus they rarely had spare parts for even minor repairs. This might have been possible for centralized maintenance facilities in the Reich. It was impossible for motor pools throughout NAZI-occupied Europe to stock all the needed spare parts. Fourth, few Germans had mechanical skills. Car ownership in Germany was low even by European standards. Unlike America German motor pools did not not have a reservoir of talent to drawn on to maintain motor vehicles. There were plenty of farm boys who knew how to care for horses, but very few that knew how to operate and maintain motor vehicles. Knowledge of maintaining motor vehicles was something that was was widespread among young Americans Who were not only able to afford automobiles, but loved working on the. There were even shop classes in high schools, something that did not exist in Germany. This all had significant impacts on transport trucks, but these problems became even more serious for tanks--a major pat of the German military success. And tanks were even more of a problem. it became even more important for tanks. Tanks were much more complicated than trucks--especially German tanks which have been described as 'over engineered'. Unlike American and Soviet tanks, German engineers made no effort to simplify designs or to make the tanks easy work on or maintain. And as the war progressed, the Germans came out with mote new tanks, each one in more and more complicated. The Germans had several major designs each made in a range of variants. But thy also used many foreign tucks A major problem was the shortage of spare parts. This was a problem for German truck. Getting spare pats for the many different foreign tucks was next to impossible. This all created a nightmare for German field motor pools. There was no way field motor pools could stock the spare parts needed or work efficiently on the various tanks, trucks, and other vehicles with the available staff. The Germans did not have the same capacity to repair vehicles at the front. The initial plan was to send them back to the Reich for even minor repairs. With Barbarossa, the Germans were forced to increase maintenance capability at the front, but were never able to meet the demand. 【Mueller-Hillebrand】 (With the Luftwaffe the situation was even worse.) Not only did this stress the overstretched Reichsbahn, but as the situation changed in the East, a retreating Ostheer lost increasing amount of armor. In the West, without control of the air, damaged vehicles were unlikely to make it back to the Reich. he Americans in contrast made the repairs near the front and and the vehicles quickly serviced. Another important factor was that American tanks and trucks were designed for ease of manufacture and maintenance. The Germans planned for maintenance and repair work to be conducted in centralized facilities in the Reich. This worked reasonably well when campaigns were fought in neighboring countries clos to he Reich. Then the Germans invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). It was also a serious problem in North Africa. Not only did the Germans produce only a fraction of the vehicles manufactured by the Allies, but they had trouble keeping the vehicles they had running -- not only finding the needed fuel as well as maintaining and repairing them.

German Horses

The Germans appear to have used some 3 million horses during World War II. They pulled together 0.6 million horses for Brbrossa alone (June 1941). Many of which did not survive he offensive. Now lage nmbrsof moor vehicles can be built in ashort period of time. How Germany obtained 3 millon horses is an ineesting question. A healthy mare can have a wide range of foals, with some producing as few as 5 and others, with excellent management, having 15 to 20 or even more over her lifetime. Horses typically stop growing and reach physical maturity around 3-5 years of age. Work horses, especially draft horses, usually begin light work after 3 years old. This meansthat the German Army needed horses 3-4 years old. So where did they all come from? The Germans masy have used pn to about 3 million horses in World War II. We think modst durvived the erly cmpigns, but many did no sduvive the Soviet campihns (espdecially the ines of 1941-42 and 1942-43) as well as he Brgration disdater (1944). The horses were obtaned from a combination of domestic requisitions, state-run breeding programs, and, most significantly, the plunder and forced contributions from occupied territories across Europe. The poduction had to bergin well befoe Hitler launched the War. This multi-faceted procurement system was essential because the German Army, despite its reputation for mechanization, remained heavily dependent on horse-drawn transport for the majority of its supply trains and artillery, especially on the difficult terrain of the Eastern Front and because of lmited fuel shortages.. Key sources of horses included:
German Farmers: In peacetime, German horses were registered for potential military use, similar to a human draft. When the war began, the army requisitioned vast numbers of horses from German farms, often 'technically purchasing/ them but at very low pices. Gerrman fsarmers had been a voting block the NAZIs had won over. It is unclear how seizing heir horses impactged their sattide oward the NAZIs, especilly because here were fen ight bnds wih the horses and he horses were imprtnt in farm operation.
State Breeding Facilities: Germany maintained state-run breeding facilities, particularly in East Prussia and Hanover, to produce horses suitable for military and civilian agricultural purposes.
Allied and neutral countries: Horses were obtained from allied and neural countries. Hungary was especially imortant. We are nt sure what he terms were for these purchases. Nefore he War began, the Gerrmans even purchased some horses from the British, who had mechanized their own forces. Allied countries such as Romania, dound that the Germans basically seized what they needed with little or no payment. This fr examole what the Germans did with Rmanian oil.
Occupied countries: As the war expanded, the Wehrmacht systematically looted horses from occupied countries or forced them to provide horses as part of 'occupation costs'. Poland was required to supply up to 4,000 horses per month. Large numbers (around 330,000) were taken from France.
Oatkrieg German soldiers as they moved east simply looted horses from Soviet collectives and state farms as they moved east.
More than one million horses were still active near the front lines when the War ended (May 1945). One not often addressed issue is the impact n farm podyction od wihdrawing uch a large number of horses. European agriculte except for Brtgain as not yet sidely mecahnized. We suspect hs was a facor in the food shortages that plagued Europe duing the War years. It did not impact Germany as badly as during World War I because the Germans expropriated food from the occupied contries, especially France. But of course Germany was impacted after the War when it had to rely on domestic food production. Again, as after World War I, only food deliveries from Amerca prevened famine and mass starvation.

Highway Systems

At the tine that Henny Ford bilt thefirst Model-T Tin Lizzy, imprved road highway connctions did not exist beteen major cities in Ameica. A young Dwight Eisenhower did not get to Europeto fght in WirldWar KI, but he was an observer as part of the 1919 Transcontinental Motor Convoy across the United States. The 62-day, 3,251-mile journey from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco aimed to test military vehicles and assess the nation's roads, revealing a dire need for better infrastructure. Theame sitation existed in hr ontds, albet withoutthebstale ofthe RovkyMountns. It wwsas the Germans built the first modern highway system--the Autobahn. They did not play major role in the War, principally because the Germans had so few cars and trucks. Images of the Autobahn rarely show many vehicles on them. The greatest military use was made by the Americans when they entered the Reich in the final months of the War (march 1945). It was the Reichsbahn that dominated German military transport. Here the Germans were very effcient. After reaching the railheads, that defincy declned. Here to lage degree the Grrmans relied on horses as they had in World War and not on trucks. Also combat operations at the front use existing road networks. This worked well for the Germnans early in the War, they could utillize the rekatively well developd Euroean road systems. They might not have been modern highways, but they were roads. As the Germnans moved east into the Soviet Union, any senlences of improved roads disappeared.

Sources

Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhart H. "German tank maintenance in World War II," German Report Series Pamphlete No. 20-202 (U.S. Army: June 1954). While published by the U.S. Army Historical Division (EUCOM) by a. group of former German generals, general sta1f officers, and tank maintenance specialists. The principal author was General Burkhart H. Mueller-Hillebrand who served as aide to the Chief of the Army General Staff before assuming command of an armored regiment on the Russian front and then progressively higher commands.

Created: 12:04 AM 5/21/2022
Last updated: 12:44 AM 11/29/2025