Figure 1.--Throuhout World War II, the primary Allied constraint was shipping. The vBritish could not hve vonductd the North African campign without Suez. Here an American Liberty Ship laden with supplies is transiting the Canl with supplies for th British Eight Army drfending Egypt. The Europans in the foreground are Yugoslav refugees from the El Shatt camp near the southern end of the Canal. It was one of several refugee camps set up by the British in the Middle East and largely supplied by the Americans.

There are three major transport milleau: land (rail and road), sea, and air. Land transport means primarily rail and to a lesser extent road. Sea transport means primarily merchant sdhipping, although in Europe river barges was of some imporance. Air transport was a factor for the first time in history, but the actual quantities relatively small. The transport mix varied by country, campaign, and geogrphic area. It was America and Japan that had the largest challenges because so much of the War was fought at such great distance from both countrie. It was America that successfully developed the greatest logistical system in human history to meet that challenge, mastrering all three transport sytems as well as helping its allies doing the same. Japan's failure to overcome the logistical challenge was an imprtant factor in the collapse of their war effort. One of the few advantages the Germans had was a highly efficent rail system anf interior lines that could rapidly deliver men and equipment to far flung battlefields. The two major failure of German arms came in the East and West where the Germans failed in delivering needed men and equipment. This began in the East in the fight for Moscow (November 1941). The Germans outran their supply lines. The same occurred at Stalingrad (November 1942). In the West, Allied air power cut the Atlantic Wall off from supplies and reinforcement (June 1944). The greatest contraint on the Allied side throughout the War was shipping. The American Liberty Ships was critical in dealing with thise contraints, but the pronlem was never eliminated.

Land/Continental

There are three modes of land transport: rail, road, and riverine transport. (Riverine/canal barges can be considered land transport becuase they are continental in character. By far the most important of these three modes is rail. And here the Germans had a huge advatage as a result of interlines, closeness to the combat zones, and the effiences of the Reichbahn. America had a massive rail system which had a huge impact on the American war economy and production levels achieved, but this advanataged ended at the water's edge where men and material had to be shipped across oceans to far flung battlefields. The imoprtance of rail was amatter of simple physics. `Goods could be movered over rails more efficently over rails than roads because there was less friction on rails than roads, meaning less energy was required. Reverine and canal transport bwas also efficient, but were resticted to where tivers flowed. Canals extended this, but were very expensivr to build anf coulf moy nr built evrywher. Theybwere also slpw. This is why rail tansport replaced riverine/canal transportbso rapidly in the 19th century. While rail was the most efficient land transport, rails had a significant limitation. First, the raild did not extend everywhere. This was especially the case in the highly mobile World war II battlefields. Thus you needed to get men and material from railheads to the front. Second, unlike World War I, rails in World War II could be interdicted. In the East this meant partisan action. In the West it meant Allied air power. As a result, while rail transport was the most imprtant mode of transprt in the Euroean campaign, road transport meaning trucks played a key role in the War. American Lend lease trucks played a hugevrole in Soviet successes like Bagration. And with the dsestruction of the French rail system by Allied air power (1944), trucks okayed a critical role in the Western campaign after D-Day. nd here the American Arsenalmof of Democracy gave the Allies a huge advantage.

Sea

Shipping was a major aspect of the War. In no other War in history has the shipping challenge been so immense. The enormity of the challenge was part of the German strategic calculation. They didn't believe that it was a challenge even America's vaunted industrial genius could master, at least within a time frame that would prevent them from mastering Europe. For the Japanese, preoccupied with naval construction, they simply failed to calculate the shipping requirements for a Pacific war. The role of American industry, the Arsenal of Democracy, is commonly addressed in World War II histories. The War was, however, not fought in America. And all those tanks, trucks, artillery, machine guns, ammunition, electronic equipment, oil, food, and other supplies was of no use unless it could be delived to the front lines. And this primarily meant shipping--shipping on a vast scale. Merchant mariners from German occupied countries joined the British war effort, but the game changer was the Henry Kaiser and his war-winning Liberty Ships. The Germans assumed that the Americans needed 9 months to build a ship. That was how long they took to build a merchant ship and they considered themselves highly efficient. When reports surfaced of the Americans building merchant ships in 10 days, the incedulous Germans dismissed the reports as absurd propaganda. But they were all too true. Even before the Allies defeated Adm. Dönitz's U-boat wolf packs (July 1943), the United States was building merchant ships much faster than the Germans could sink them. And American shipyards also produced needed merchant shipping in large quantiyties for the Pacific. While the U-boats get a huge smount of attention by historians and Hollywood. It is the U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Service that waged the only successful commerce campaign of the War--obliterating the Japanese Maru fleet. This cut the Home Islands off from their recently conquered Southern Resource Zone--the reason the Japanese went to war in the first place.

Air

Air transport was a new development in World War II. Air transport could not play a major role in tranporting men and equipment in terms of quantity. The capacity and number of aircraft provided a tiny percentage of military transport needs. Air transport could and did play an important role in special circumnstances--almost always this meant for the Americans. At the time of the War only America had a sizeable civil aviation industry. The Germans and British had civil aviation industries, but on a much smaller scale. Lufthansa was in large measure a cover for military aviation prohibited by the Versailles Treaty. This meant that a modern American aircraft existed that could be used for air transport. And it would be the Americans who would domiate World War II air transport. The newly introdyced Douglas DC-3 was converted to the C-47 Sky Train for military use. Curtis developed the C-46 specifically for the military. It was the more capable plane, but production problems meant that it was produced in much smaller numbers and late in the War. The Germans had the venerablev Ju-52 and although they built nearly 5,000, it was not a major factor in the War. The Ju-52 had a nuch smaller cargp capacity than the American C-47 and was slower. More importantly the Germans began to lose air dominance. And transports are vulnerable without air superiority. Fighter escorts were inadequate, in part because of the intensifying Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign. Many Ju-52s were shot down or destroyed in the air. The Germans were the first to use military air transport, delivering paratroopers during the invsasion of the Netherlands (May 1940). This ended a year later after the partoopers were decimated on Crete (April 1941). The Germans had some success supplying cut off units in the Soviet Union (Winter 1941-42), but this led to the Stalingrad disaster when the Luftwaffe abjectly failed (Winter 1942-43). Many u-52s were used to rush troops and equipment to Tunisia just as they were desperately needed to supply the Stalingrad pocket (November 1942). This led to another German disaster. The Germas came up with the six engine Me-323 Gigant (Giant), the largest transport aircraft of the War. It was a powered variant of the Me-321 military glider. It was introducd as part of the Tunisian operation and proved a disater, basically giant ns slow aerial target. Gigant bs just oinevexamole of the many failed Luftwaffe projects and wasrted resources. By the time it was introduced the Allies were gaining air superiority. The American Arsenal of Democrcy led to a much larger and more robust air transport capability. The American work horse was the C-47 and over 10,000 were built. A little over 3,000 C46s were also built. The larger four engine C-54 was only available in small mumbers toward the end of the War. (It would become famous in the Berlin Air Lift after the War.) The most challening American transport effort was flying The Hump over the towering Himayas in the CBI campaign (1942-45) which used the C-46. Air transport played a critical supply role in Burma and New Guinea. The C-47 inserted paratrooper and towed gliders which were vital for the success of D-Day (June 1944). The Germans also had paratoopers, but after Crete they were a purly ground force, albeit battle hardened. The primary American air transport role beyond airbiorn drops was in delivering critical spare parts and evacuating the wounded. The C-47 helped supply the Bastogne pocket duting the Battle of the Bulge (Decemnber 1944). The British mostly used the C-47 which for some reason they called the Dakota. The C-47 became legendary and is actually still in use today because of it design excellence and adaptability.

Created: 5:01 PM 5/14/2022
Last updated: 5:01 PM 5/14/2022