*** war and social upheaval: World War II -- logistics and transport








World War II: Logistics and Transport--Land Continental

German rail lines
Figure 1.-- Here we see Mongollon, New Mexico in 1940. This is about as deep as you can get in backwater America-yet the street is full of cars. We have noted countless images of Geramn city and small town streets without a motor vehicle in sight. This reflected the size of the motor vehicle indudtry The difference in German and American industry would have a profound impact on World War II.

There are three modes of land transport: rail, road, and riverine transport. (Riverine/canal barges can be considered land transport becuase they are continental in character.) By far the most important of these three modes was rail. The German Reiuchbahn played acentral fole in the German war effort economy as well tragically in the Holocaust. Despite the must discussed Autobahn, road trabsport was mych less imprtant becse of the country's relive smll motor vehicle fleet. And here the Germans had a huge advatage as a result of interior lines, closeness to the combat zones, and the effiences of the Reichbahn. America had a massive rail system which had a huge impact on the American war economy and production levels achieved. Given the importance of the Arsenal of democracy, the American rail system was vital--abd often inhearled. This role, however ended at the water's edge where men and material had to be shipped across oceans to far flung battlefields. And throughout the War, shipping would be the primary constraint on the American and allied effort in general. The Soviet rail system was also vital. In the case of the Soviet Union, there were virtully no developed highhway system between cities. The importance of rail was a matter of simple physics. `Goods could be moved over rails more efficently than over often unimproved roads. This was a maater of simple physics because there was less friction on rails than roads, meaning less energy (fuel) was required. Reverine and canal transport was also efficient, but were resticted to where rivers flowed. Canals extended this, but were very expensivr to build and could not be built everywhere. The were also slow. This is why rail transport replaced riverine/canal transport so rapidly in the 19th century. While rail was the most efficient land transport, rails had a significant limitation. First, the rails did not extend everywhere. This was especially the case in the highly mobile World War II battlefields. Thus you needed to get men and material from railheads to the front. Second, unlike World War I, rails in World War II could be interdicted. In the East this meant partisan action. In the West it meant Allied air power. As a result, while rail transport was the most important mode of transprt in the European campaign, road transport meaning trucks played a key role in the War. American Lend lease trucks played a hugevrole in Soviet successes like Bagration. And with the dsestruction of the French rail system by Allied air power (1944), trucks payed a critical role in the Western campaign after D-Day. And here the American Arsenalmof of Democracy gave the Allies a huge advantage.

Rail

By far the most important of the three ground World War II modes of transport was rail. The German Reichbahn played a central role in the German war effort and tragically in the Holocaust. Despite the much discussed Autobahn, road transport was much less important because of the country's relative small motor vehicle fleet. All of the major belligerant countries had important rail systems. They weere huge , for the most part efficently run operations vital to the ecomnomy. The Germans made the greatest use of the rail system in their war effort. And it produced a huge advatage as a result of interior lines, closeness to the combat zones, and the effiences of the Reichbahn. A major fctor in the outcome of the Ostkrieg, the decisive campaign of the War, was logistics dominated by the rail netwok which played an importnt role in the outcome. One issue was gauge. The countries of Western Eurooe all used stabdard gague. A problem for the Germans was the different gague used by the Soviets. The Russian rail system had a wider 5 ft gage (eventually redefined to 4 ft 11 27⁄32 in) than standard European gage (4 ft 8 1⁄2 in). The difference appears to be primary the influence of American raulroad engineers at an early stage of Russian railroad construction. The Germans as they moved east had to relay Soviet tracks. America had a massive rail system which had a huge impact on the American war economy and production levels achieved. Given the importance of the Arsenal of democracy, the American rail system was vital--abd often inhearled. This role, however ended at the water's edge where men and material had to be shipped across oceans to far flung battlefields. And thgroughout the War, shipping would be the primary constraint on the American and allied effort in general. The Soviet rail system was also vital. In the case of the Soviet Union, there were virtully no developed highhway system between cities. The importance of rail was a matter of simple physics. `Goods could be moved over rails more efficently than over often unimproved roads. This was a maater of simple physics.because there was less friction on rails than roads, meaning less energy (fuel) was required.

Road

The Germans built the first modern highway system--the autbahn. Tey did not ply vaajor role in the War, princpally because the Germans had so few cars and trucks. Images of theAutobahn rarely show maby vehicles on them. The greatest miitary usewas made by the Americans when they entered the Reich in the final months of the War. It was the Reichbahn that dominted military tanspoprt. While rail was the most efficient land transport, rails had a significant limitation. First, the rails did not extend everywhere. This was especially the case in the highly mobile World War II battlefields. Thus you needed to get men and material from railheads to the front. Second, unlike World War I, rails in World War II could be interdicted. (The same was true of trucks, but not easily because rail lines were were not as spread out as roads and had vulnerablev hubs. In the East this meant partisan action. In the West it meant Allied air power. As a result, while rail transport was the most important mode of transport in the European campaign, road transport meaning trucks played a key role in the War. American Lend lease trucks played a huge role in Soviet successes like Bagration. And with the distruction of the French rail system by Allied air power (1944), trucks payed a critical role in the Western campaign after D-Day. With trucks the llies haf a huge advantage. First, Allied productioin far exceeded Axis profuction. This is one reason the Germans used so many horses in the War. The American Arsenal of of Democracy gave the Allies, especially the automobile industry, gave the Allies a huge advantage. Second, trucks ran on gasoline or diesel and oil was the German Achilles' heel. The Germans could not have used many more trucks, even if they had been ble to build them because they did not have the oil. Third, the Germans had maintenance ptoblems. They seized vehicles from all over occupied Europe. Thus they rarely had spare parts for even minor repairs. This might have been possible for centalized minenamnce facilities in the Reich. It was impossible for motorpools througout NAZI-occupied Europe to stock all the needed spare parts. Fourth, few Germans had mechannical skills. Car ownershio in Germany was low even by Europeamn stabdards. Unlike America German motor pools did not not have a reservoir of talent to drawn on to maintain motor vehicles. There were plenty of farm boys who knew how to care for horses, but very few that knew how to operate and maintain motor vehicles. Knowledge of maintaining motor vehicles was something that was was widespread among young Americans Who were not only able to afford autmobiles, but loved working on the. There were even shop classes in high schools, something that did not exist in Germany. This all had significant impacts on transport trucks, but these pronlems became even more serious for tanks--a major pat of the German military success. And tanksd were even nmore of problem. it became even more important for tanks. Tanks were much more complicated than trucks--especially German tnks which haveb described as 'over enginnered'. Unlike Ameican and Soviet tanks, Germnan engineers made no effort to simplify designs or to make the tanks easy work on or maintain. And as the war progressed, the Germans came out with mote new tanks, each one in more and more complicated. The Germans haf sight major designs each made in a range of variants. A major problem was the shortage of spare parts. This all created a nightmare for German field motorpools. There was no way field motorpools could stock the spare parts needed or work efficently on the various tanks, trucks, and other vehicles with the available staff. The Germans did not have the same capacity to repair vehicles at the front. The initial plan was to send them back to the Reich for even minor repors. With Barbarossa, the Germans were forced to increase maintenance capability at the front, but were never able to meet the demand. [Mueller-Hillebrand] (With the Luftwaffe the ituation was even worse.) Not only did this stress the overstreahed Reichbabn, but as the sitution changed in the East, a retreating Ostheer lost increasing anount of armor. In the West, wihout contol of the air, damaged vehicles were unlikely to make it back to the Reich. he Americans in contrast made the repairs near the front and and the vehicles quickly serviced. Another imprtant factor was that American tanks and trucks were designd for ease of manufacture and maintnance. The Germans abticipated maintance and reoair work was to be conducted in centralized facilities in the Reich. This worked resonably well until the Germabs invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). It was also a pserious problem in North Africa. Not only did the Germans produce only a fraction of the vehicles produced by the Allies, but they had trouble keepin the vehicles they running, not only finmding the needed fuel as well as maintaing and repoairing them. ,

Riverine

Riverine and canal transport was also efficient, but were resticted to where rivers flowed. Canals extended this, but were very expensivr to build and could not be built everywhere. The were also slow. This is why rail transport replaced riverine/canal transport so rapidly in the 19th century.

Sources

Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhart H. "German tank maintenance in World War II," German Report Series Pamphlete No. 20-202 (U.S. Army: June 1954). While published by the U.S. Army Historical Division (EUCOM) by a. group of former German generals, general sta1f officers, and tank maintenance specialists. The principal author was General Burkhart H. Mueller-Hillebrand who served as aide to the Chief of the Army General Sta1f before assuming command of an armored regiment on the Russian front and then progressively higher commands.







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Created: 9:40 AM 1/16/2020
Last updated: 10:21 PM 5/20/2022