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The Germans not only began rearming by building weapons, but once the weapons had begun to roll off assembly lines, they reintroduced conscription (1935). This was the critical step in Hitler's preparations for war. It was a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty, but neither Britain nor France reacted beyond ineffectual diplomatic protests. This is when they could have reacted, failing to do so meant that war was inevitable as soon as the Wehrmacht was armed and trained. Germany had many weaknesses that had to be overcome in waging another war, including limited industrial capacity and the lack of natural resources, including iron ore and oil. But an often overlooked weakness was that few German boys, both city and farm boy, had experience with motorized vehicles, either driving or maintaining the engines. As World War II would be a war of movement, operating and maintaining motor vehicles from jeeps to tanks as well as aircraft and naval engines would be a vital part of the war effort. The Germans addressed this problem by creating a special unit of the Hitler Youth (HJ) to train motor vehicle specialists--the Motor HJ. While less well known than the Flieger (air) and Marine HJ specialized units, they none the less played an important role in Germany's preparations for war and what would become the greatest military conflict in human history, the war in the East. Here vast numbers of motorized military vehicles were needed as the Wehrmacht and Red army fought it out on the vast Eurasian Steppe. A combat environment in which huge numbers of drivers and mechanics were needed. This was a special problem for the Germans as so few young men had grown up around cars and other motor vehicles and the Wehrmacht used such a hodgepodge of vehicles and engines in the East. America as late as 1941 had not mobilized for war. As the Panzers neared Moscow and the decisive battle of the War would be fought, the vast armada of American motor vehicles needed to fight the war did not yet exist. What did exist was the largest reservoir of mechanically savvy talent in the world--American youth. More Americans knew about motor vehicles, both how to drive them and even more importantly, how to maintain and repair them, than the mechanics in all the rest of the world combined. This was not part of Hitler's calculation. He knew America was a danger. It had turned victory into defeat in World War I. He believed, however, that the Wehrmacht could complete its conquest of Europe before America reacted, let alone mobilized. He did not, however, plan for the RAF's startling defeat of the Luftwaffe (1940) or the Red Army's Winter offensive before Moscow (1941). Nor did he anticipate how rapidly a largely unarmed America could arm and train a modern, mechanized army. The pool of young Americans familiar with motors and engines was a huge asset as America entered
the War.
The countries that were to create the Axis powers began preparing their people for war even before Hitler seized power in Germany (1933). Once Hitler was in power, that preparation went into over drive. And this while the democracies slept, at the onset of the War, the Axis not only had the best weaponry, but the most motivated and dedicated soldiery to fight the War. The Italians were an exception, but this was certainly the case for the Germans and Japanese. Simply put, Stephen Ambrose was wrong, the children of the democracy do not make the best soldiers. 【Ambrose】 They are to prone to question their superiors which does not make for the needed military discipline. But there was a major wrinkle in the German and Japanese military planning. World War II was to be an industrial war and in particular unlike Wold War I an highly mobile industrial war in which motor vehicles as well as aircraft and naval vessels would play central roles. And it was in the democracies (America, Britain, and France) that the industry that built motor vehicles in large numbers developed. It is interesting to look at streets in Germany and Japan before the War, one can only ask--where are the cars and trucks. Even on the major streets in big cities, you do not see many motor vehicles. Not only did the Allies, even with the loss of France, have the ability to build motor vehicles in vast numbers, but its young people grew up in and around motor vehicles, even on the farm. Tractors were revolutionizing agriculture in the democracies. They were conspicuously absent on German, Italian, and Japanese farms. Few Germans in contrast even knew how to drive a car, let alone maintain it. And this problem was magnified by German craftsmanship. The Germans created tanks that were marvels of engineering, but with no thought as to mass production or ease of maintenance. There were plenty of German who knew how to handle the millions of horses used by Wehrmacht, but relatively few that do how to drive a car, let alone a tank. And even fewer that knew how to maintain vehicles. German secondary schools were highly academic. Few had shop classes as was the case for American high schools. This would be a serious problem when the German easy victories ceased and the Wehrmacht has to fight protracted mobile warfare. The situation was even worse for the Japanese. Few Japanese soldiers had even ridden in a car.
The Germans not only began rearming by building weapons, but once the weapons had begun to roll off assembly lines, they reintroduced conscription (1935). This was the critical step in Hitler's preparations for war. It was a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty, but neither Britain nor France reacted beyond ineffectual diplomatic protests. This is when they could have reacted, failing to do so meant that war was inevitable as soon as the Wehrmacht was armed and trained. And NAZI propaganda along with the Hitler Youth had primed young Germans for war in a way that young men in the democracies were not. Germany had many weaknesses that had to be overcome in waging another war, including limited industrial capacity and the lack of natural resources, including iron ore and oil. But an often overlooked weakness was that few German boys, both city and farm boy, had experience with motorized vehicles, either driving or maintaining the engines. As World War II would be a war of movement, operating and maintaining motor vehicles from jeeps to tanks as well as aircraft and naval engines would be a vital part of the war effort. The Germans addressed this problem by creating a special unit of the Hitler Youth (HJ) to train motor vehicle specialists--the Motor HJ. While less well known than the Flieger (air) and Marine HJ specialized units, they none the less played an important role in Germany's preparations for war and what would become the greatest military conflict in human history, the war in the East. Here vast numbers of motorized military vehicles were needed as the Wehrmacht and Red army fought it out on the vast Eurasian Steppe. A combat environment in which huge numbers of drivers and mechanics were needed. This was a special problem for the Germans as so few young men had grown up around cars and other motor vehicles and the Wehrmacht used such a hodgepodge of vehicles and engines in the East. In addition, German military equipment was not made for operation and service in the field. German Panzers in particular were over-engineered and required more servicing than American and Soviet tanks, placing a greater strain on maintenance operations. Hitler knew America was a danger. It had turned victory into defeat in World War I. He believed, however, that the Wehrmacht could complete its conquest of Europe before America reacted, let alone mobilized. He did not, however, plan for the RAF's startling defeat of the Luftwaffe (1940) or the Red Army's Winter offensive before Moscow (1941). Nor did he anticipate how rapidly a largely unarmed America could arm and train a modern, mechanized army. The pool of young Americans familiar with motors and engines was a huge asset as America entered
Of all the major World War II combatants, Italy fielded an army that was least prepared to fight. This was apparent from the beginning of the War. The Italian Army performed poorly when it invaded Greece from Albania(October 1940), even they outnumbered he Greeks and were better equipped. The Greeks drive the Italians back into Albania. The Italians also failed in the Western Desert when they invaded Egypt , Operazione E) (September 1940). They badly outnumbered the poorly equipped British, but were routed and driven back into Libya. Eventually the Germans would have to rescue the Italians in both the Balkans and Western Desert. World War II historians debate just why the Italians performed so poorly. Ineffective leadership was a factor. And Italy was not a major industrial power, they were poorly equipped. Much of the population did not have the skills useful fir modern warfare such as experience working with machinery. But a major factor was the fact that unlike the Germans and Japanese, the average Italian soldier did not have his heart in the War. This was especially true of the large number of soldiers from southern Italy who grew up in virtually feudal circumstances. The soldiers were not well cared for by their officers which just confirmed the opinion that the Government was not operating in their best interests. Unlike the NAZIs in Germany, the Fascists did not capture the allegiance of many Italians or begin to breaking down the hierarchical class structure. The working class in the north seems more effectively politicized despite the left-wing attitudes of industrial workers. The middle-class had been more effectively politicized by the Fascists. The ordinary Italian soldier, however, had no idea why they were fighting the British and even less why they wound up fighting Americans. Many Italian soldiers would like nothing better than to emigrate to America.
There were no soldiers during World War II that were more committed to the War than the Japanese soldier. Both the officer corps and the average soldier were fervent Japanese patriots to the point of xenophobia. The Japanese officer core was committed to the expansion of the Japanese Empire. The average soldier may not have been fully committed to the geo-political issues, but they were every bit as patriotic and devoted to the Emperor as their leaders. The War took on a sacred mission. And the great bulk of the military including the youngest recruit was prepared to fight to the death. It was not just devotion to the Emperor, although that was a factor. The Japanese soldier did not want to dishonor his family by surrendering. He did not think he could ever return to his town or village with the shame of surrender. We do not know of a mass army in all of history that was so fervently devoted to a war effort. Japan did not have an industrial base to adequately equip their young men, but they sent them into war with a fighting spirit unmatched in history. Unfortunately for these men, their commanders did not prove to be the masters of war that they saw themselves to be. And their leaders in Tokyo committed to a Pacific War without any ability to adequately supply or feed them. Thousands would die in futile banzai charges. More would starve to death as part of isolated island garrisons.
The Western Allies after World War I rapidly disbanded their massive militaries and war production reverted to civilian products. America and Britain ended military conscription which had been a temporary war-time measure. The public concern was how to avoid another War and the primary attitude was that the best way was ton cut military spending, including research and development, to the bone. The French continued conscription, but like America and Britain, the conscripts primary mind set was how to avoid another war. Movements like pacifism, isolationism, and appeasement sapped the military spirit of these nations. Their lack of ardor was in sharp contrast to spirit of the German and Japanese soldiers who were being convinced that the international system created by the Americans and British in particular, were a fundamental threat to their national existence. Even before rearmament began, the Western Allies had one fundamental advantage. Democracies responded to public demands. This meant that their economies responded primarily to consumer demand. Germany had the second largest industrial economy in the world, but it was less consumer based. (It had been molded by the Imperial German Government and perceived strategic needs.) This is part of the reason that the Western democracies had the largest motor vehicle industries--and the ability to produce the vehicles needed to fight a mobile war. But it was not just the ability to produce motor vehicles, it was the men needed tom operate and maintain these vehicles. At a time that virtually all American teenagers (including many girls) could drive and many boys could maintain motor vehicles, a German youth felt lucky to have a bicycle. Japan and Italy were in even worse shape. And to make matters worse for the Axis, German designers felt no compunction to design vehicles that could be mass produced. German industrialists sneered at mass production and the rickety Ford Model-T that at first came off the assembly line. Nor were they concern with ease of maintenance. In sharp contrast to the German Panzers, GI mechanics could loosen a few bolts on the M-4 Sherman and you could get into the tank's innards for maintenance or repairs. Both mass production and maintenance would have a major impact on World War II battlefields.
The Soviet Union was an anomaly, it fought World war II, first as a NAZI ally and helped supply the NAZI war machine (1939-41) and then as a part of the Allied coalition (1941-45). A strong propaganda theme of the Communist state was that war was a capitalist phenomenon and that workers should oppose war and military spending--but only in the West. Soviet workers should support a vast military establishment. Socialist leaders are very poor at creating prosperous economies. They are, however, rather good as creating powerful militaries, one reason NAZI Germany and the Soviet Union were such powerful countries during World War II. Not all Red Army recruits were sold on Communism. but the NAZI invasion changed that, turning the population and Red Army into fervent soldiers motivated to defend the Russian motherland. The barbarity of the NAZI invaders further fueled their resolve. The Red Army officer corps did not have the competence of the German Generals, in part because Stalin murdered so many in the Military Purges of the 1930s. Actually the Red army developed Blitzkrieg-like tactics because they worked with the Germans as part of the Rapallo Treaty. The Red Army was limited at first because of its small industrial base, especially motor vehicles. Stain's Five Year Plans would continue the industrial expansion of Russia began during the Tsarist Era. Of course Stalin did not want cars, but he did want trucks, tractors, and tanks. And to accomplish this, joint ventures were arranged with American automobile companies. The result was that at the time of World War II was that, while Germany had a larger industrial base, the Soviet Union has a larger and more efficient motor vehicle industry. This is part of the reason that the Soviets produced so many more trucks and tanks than the Germans.
Ambrose. Stephen. Citizen Soldiers (1997).
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