** German Industrial Effort: Concentration on the War in the West West Wall








German Industrial Effort Concentration on the West: Tank Construction

Figure 1.--Despite the German advanatages, the Sioviet Uniin outpriduced the Germans in tanks and other major weapons grouops. Here we seen operations at an important tank plant. They are manufacturung T-34s. In the foreground is the main armament -- 76.2 mm F-34 guns from the 1940 model. This was from the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant, 1943.

The first tanks appeared on the battlefield in World War I and made an important contribution to the Alied victory. Tanks came to the forefront in World War II. German Panzers played a major role in the success of Blitzkrieg victories (1939-41). At first they faced Poland which did not have a significant tank force. The British and French had tanks, in some cases better tanks, but they lacked an effetive tactical docrine or potent anti-tank guns (1940). The first real opposition was in the Soviet Union (June 1941). The Soviets had huge numbers of tanks, some 10,000 (mostly light BT series tanks or obsolete T-26 models), but the Germanss were using many tanks like the Czech tanks whuch were not much better. Stalin had, however, arrested and murdered most of the officers associated with Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the innovative Soviet commander. Most Soviet tanks were poorly designed, but the real problem was tactics. Expousing Tukhachevsky tactics could get you shot. The highly effective T-34s were just beginning to appear. A critical question that has to be asked is why did the Soviets outproduce the Germans in tanks when the Germans has a larger steel indudstry and the Germans overran the Western Soviet Union where much of Soviet heavy industry was located. Some plants were shipped East, but many were not. It is important to note that even after launching the War that Hitler did not fully mobilize the Germany economy. And after the spectaclar early victories believed that what he had was more than adequate to wage the short summer campaign thsat he thought would destroy the Red Army. In the month that Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht in to the Soviet Union, German factories only produced 250 tanks. That was not sufficent to even replace tanks lost from normal wear and tear, let alone combat losses. The Germans did increase tabk production, but no where near Soviet expansion. The Battle of Kursk (july 1943) was the greatest tank battle of the War and will surely never be equalled. There was nothing like it in the West. This might suggest that the bulk of German industry was committed to the Ostkrieg and building the tanks, trucks, and other equipomebnt they needed. But in fact this was not occuring. The German and Soviets had roughly comparable economies in GDP terms. (This is admittedly difficult to measure.) While the overall GDP was comparable. the Germans had a much larger heavy indudtrial sector. This can be seen in steel production. Which should have meant that the Germans would out produce the Soviets in tanks. Just thge opposite, however, is the case. The Soviets massively outproduced the Germans. Soviet tank production eas phemoneal. Why was this? There seem to be two major reasons. First, German industrial policy. Second, the Germans had to use their steel in other areas, primarily areas to fight the war in the West--meaning the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe as well as artilery to orotect German cities from Allied bombers. Whilke the Soviets, fighting on only one front, were able to conentrate their industru=ial effort on tank production.

Initial Impact (1939-41)

The first tanks appeared on the battlefield in World War I and made an important contribution to the Alied victory. Tanks came to the forefront in World War II. German Panzers played a major role in the success of Blitzkrieg victories (1939-41). At first they faced Poland which did not have a significant tank force. The British and French had tanks, in some cases better tanks, but they lacked an effetive tactical docrine or potent anti-tank guns (1940)

German and Soviet Tank Assessment

Neither the Germans or the Russians deployed significant tank forces in Wiorld War I. After the War both the Germans and new Soviet Government were interntional outcasts. The Germans and Soviets decided to cooperate as part of the Rapallo Accords. One of the major efforts were experiments in miobile tank warfare. As a result both countriess developed advanhce tactical dictrines. the Soviets, began building tanks. The Germzns restricted by the Veesailles doctrine did not begin building tsnks until Hitkler seized power

Germany

The Germans were impressed with their performance in Poland (September 1939) and espevcially in France (May 1940). They also were also spectacularly successful in the Balkanns (April 1941). It was not entiurely cloear to German commanders and especially to Hitler, that the successes were due largely to the tctical dictrine (Blitzkrieg), and not the qiality of their tanks. At vthe same time they noted the Soviet fuasco in the cWinter War with Finland, duggesting that the Red Army would be easier to defeat than France. The Germans had not idea how many tanks the Soviets had or their ability to manufacture tanks. There mnugacturing capability was not seen as importabnt because the assessment was that the Red army woulkd be defeated in a short summer campaign. Recordings made of Hitler's meetuing with Finish leadee mannerheim reveal thatb Hitler was stunned at vthe Siviet capability of producing sommany tanks.

Soviet Union

The Soviers like the Germans haad developoed advance tactical dictrine employing tanks in mobile warfare. Unfirtynatrely fir the Soviet people, Stalin began arresting the Red Army leadership as part of Great Purges. And the people he targeted were the very officers thst had deceloped mobil tank warrfare tactucs as part of the Rapallo program. Stalin had, however, arrested and murdered most of the officers associated with Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the innovative Soviet commander. Expousing Tukhachevsky tactics could get you shot. While Stalin decimated the leadership of Soviet mikitary forces, he did build tanks in karge numbers. And Sovuet experience in the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War showed real weakeness in tank design. The result was a new generation of Soviet tanks that were superior to anything the Germans had. including the T-34 and KV-2. These tanks began reaching Red Army units in 1941, albeit in small numbrrs and without a sound tactical doctrine.

Barbarossa (June 1941)

The first real opposition the Germans encountered was in the Soviet Union (June 1941). The Soviets had huge numbers of tanks, nearly 10,000 but mostly obsolete tyoes (light BT series or T-26 models). The Germans were using many basically obslete tanks as well, like the Czech tanks whuch were not much better. The Germas, however, benefitted from their mnastery of Blitzkrieg tactical doctrine. As a result, the Germans destroyed huge numbers of Soviet tanks in thev first weeks of Barbarossa. The Soviets assumed that the Ukraine would be the primary German target. As a result, much id their armor was positioned there. This resulted in the Battle of Brody (June 23-30, 1941). Until Kurskt it was the largest tank battle in history. The German 1st Panzer Group's III Army Corps and XLVIII Army Corps (Motorized) attacked five mechanized corps of the Soviet 5th Army and 6th Army in the triangle formed by the towns of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody. It was the largest tank engagement of the various Soviet border defensive battles. The Red Army armored formations inflicted heavy losses on the German armored unitds, but suffered enormous losses of tanks. The poor quality of most Soviet tanks, Luftwaffe air control, and a breakdown in Red Army command and control were major factors. The Germans were horrified to find that while still small in numbers, the new generation of Soviet tanks, prominently the T-34, was more advanced than any tank they had. This did not bode well for the German invasion plan which was underpinned on having a quality advantage in wweaponry over the Red Army.

Production

A critical question that has to be asked is why did the Soviets outproduce the Germans in tanks when the Germans has a larger steel indudstry and the Germans overran the Western Soviet Union where much of Soviet heavy industry was located. Some plants were shipped East, but many were not. It is important to note that even after launching the War that Hitler did not fully mobilize the Germany economy. And after the spectaclar early victories believed that what he had was more than adequate to wage the short summer campaign thsat he thought would destroy the Red Army. In the month that Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht in to the Soviet Union, German factories only produced 250 tanks. That was not sufficent to even replace tanks lost from normal wear and tear, let alone combat losses. The Germans did increase tabk production, but no where near Soviet expansion. The Battle of Kursk (July 1943) was the greatest tank battle of the War and will surely never be equalled. There was nothing like it in the West. This might suggest that the bulk of German industry was committed to the Ostkrieg and building the tanks, trucks, and other equipomebnt they needed. But in fact this was not occuring.

Economies

The German and Soviets had roughly comparable economies in GDP terms. (This is admittedly difficult to measure.) While the overall GDP was comparable. the Germans had a much larger heavy industrial sector, despite advances made in the Soviet Union as part of Stalin's Five Year Plans. Here Soviet apologists seen to depict thus as only possivke vecause of Communism and Stalin's iron hand. Actually if you look at pre-Woeld War I economic trends you will find that Tsarst Rissia was rapidly expanding its industrial economy. It was the war and the Bolshevik Revolution tht interupted this expansion. Without the wr and the Boldheviks, Russia could have become anb edven greater industrial power than the Soviets schiebed and without the terriuble atticities ciommited against the Ruissiuan and Ukranianb peasantry. And importntky fir the future, griowth during the Tsarist era was real growth, poroducing effuicent ebterprises and compoertitive products. As we saw at the end oif the Cold war, Sioviet enterprises were both ineffuicent and unprofitable. The vsliue of prifucts comeing out of Siviet factoiries were wirth less than the value of raw mateials goung into them. The German superiority can be seen in steel production. A factor here is the German Barbarossa invasion. Much of Soviet industry was located in the west and overun by the advancing Germans. The Soviets manage to move some industrial plants east beyond the Urals, but many were lost to the Germans. The German superiority in heavy industry should have meant that the Germans would out produce the Soviets in tanks. Just the opposite, however, is the case. And if the Soviets survived the initial blow of a tange of ecomomoiv factors come into play. The Germans seized much of the best agricultural land in the Soviet Union. Hitler sssumed that with this land he could feed the German people. This did nor work out. Food from the East barely fed the Ostheer, very limited quantities reached the Reich--in part because of brutal German occupation policies. ThecReich was fed, but moist from the iccuoied West, especially France. Whilke the occupied East provided disappointing quantities of food, the Germnan occupation denied the agricultural bounty of the UJkraine and ither western agricultural aeasvto the Soviet Union. This meant very sderious rationing had to be implemented. It is ine reason that food was an imoortantnpart of Lend Lease deliveries. The Germans had no interest in Soviet industry and made little effort to bring industrial plants not destroyed by the retrating Russians back to opetation. TThe Reast was to be avast German economic colony. The Germans were primarily interested in natural resources like coal mines and especially oil. Here again, because of Soviet Sciorcched Earth operations, very limited shioments oif Soviet raw materilas ever reached the Reich.

Soviet Production Success

The Soviets massively outproduced the Germans. Soviet tank production was phenomenal. This requires some examinatiion. Why was this given the Germam industrial advantages in heavy industry. It seems to be an advantage the Germans durely would have takjen advantage of as itwas one of theur few advantages as Hitler moved toward war. There seem to be two major reasons. First, industrial policy, both German and Soviet. Here we are talking about German incometence and Soviet competence. Second, the Germans had to use their steel in other areas, primarily areas to fight the war in the West--meaning the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe as well as artilery to protect German cities from Allied bombers. While the Soviets, fighting on only one front, were able to conentrate their industrial effort on the oroduction of a criticl weapon systenm--the tank.

Industrial policy

The Germans had many advantahes when it came to industrial production. Germany had a larger heavy industrial sector than the Sovietrs--especially steel production. The emphasis of German manufacturers was on engineering and quality. In warfare, however, when you nsend material into battle and it only has a potential working life of a few months, beautifully enginneredd, high quiality tanks and other weapons may not be the nest industrial policy. But it is with mass priduction that Siviets excelled. One author writes. "Richard Overy and I agree that the technological key to Soviet superiority in theoutput of weapons was mass production. At the outbreak of war Soviet industry as a whole was not larger and not more productive than German industry. The non–industrial resources on which Soviet industry could draw were larger than Germany’sin the sense of territory and population, but of considerably lower quality, more far–flung, and less well integrated. Both countries had given considerable thought toindustrial mobilisation preparations, but the results were of questionable efficacy. Inboth countries war production was poorly organised at first and productivity in themilitary–industrial sector had been falling for several years. The most importantdifference was that Soviet industry had made real strides towards mass production,while German industry was still locked into an artisan mode of production that placeda premium on quality and assortment rather than quantity. Soviet industry producedfewer models of each type of weapon, and subjected them to less modification, butproduced them in far larger quantities. Thus the Soviet Union was able to make considerably more effective use of its limited industrial resources than Germany." [Harrison, p.5]

War in the West

The Germans had to use their steel in other areas, primarily areas to fight the war in the West--meaning the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe as well as artilery to protect German cities from Allied bombers. While the Soviets, fighting on only one front, were able to conentrate their industrial effort on tank production. Thecwar in the West is not well undestood. Except for the Battle of Britain, it looked like the Germans were achieving great victories. The U-boat were sinking huge numbers of Allied ships. The strategic air camoaign was not disruoting German war production. The Gernans cinquered u=in Yugoslavia abd Greece within a few weeks and ven carried off a parachute invasiin of Greece. Rommel's frika Kprps defeafted larger British armies in the Western Desert. When Ametica entered the War, Unoats began sinking American shipping a=allmalong the Atlantuc coast. The Britiush kandings at Dieppe was eaasily defeated. Iris absolutely the case that bthere were few successes in the West until Alamein and Torch. But what was occuring even beforevthe victorues begab was that the Germans were being forced to divert most of their industrial production away from the decisive theater of the War--the Eastern Front. The Germans from the beginning of Barbarossa (June 1941) committed the bulk of their manpower to the Ostheer, but the war vin the West prevented them from adequantetly supportiung them the great bulk of the Ostheer was unmotirized infantry--some 75-80 mpercent. They moved east on foot supplied by hiorse-deawn carts. Even their artillery was largely horse drawn. It does not take much industry to provide horse carts and bicycles. It did take a huge industrial effort to equip the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe to fight the war in the West as well as the V-weapon projects. And as theWestern Allies geberated increasing mikitarynoower, the Germans hgad to increase their insustrial support fior the vfirces fightung there.

Sources

Harrison, Mark. "The USSR and Total War: Why didn’t the Sovieteconomy collapse in 1942?" Paper to the Total War V conference on “A world at total war: global conflict and thepolitics of destruction, 1939–1945”, Hamburg, 29 August to 1 September 2001.







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Created: 5:44 AM 1/14/2021
Last updated: 5:45 AM 1/14/2021